Louisiana State University

LSU Digital Commons
LSU Master's Theses

Graduate School

2012

Photojournalism as photonationalism
Jeremy Kreusch
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses
Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons

Recommended Citation
Kreusch, Jeremy, "Photojournalism as photonationalism" (2012). LSU Master's Theses. 2708.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses/2708

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in LSU Master's Theses by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.

PHOTOJOURNALISM AS PHOTONATIONALISM

A Thesis
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
in
The Department of Art

by
Jeremy Kreusch
B.F.A., Columbus College of Art and Design, 2008
May 2012

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………………iii
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION: INCOGNITO ACTIVISTS? STOCKHOLM
SYNDROME?....................................................................................................................1
1.1 Photojournalism as Photonationalism………………………………………………...2
1.2 “Embedding” Photojournalists…………………………………..……………………4
1.3 Photography, Public Opinion, and Political Ideology…………...…………………..8
1.4 Organization and Methods……………………..…………………………………….11
CHAPTER 2. SYMBOLIZING EVIL – VIETNAM: THE (UNINTENDED?) POWER
OF PARTICULARLY DAMNING IMAGES…………....……………………..………14
2.1 Standard Photographs……………….……….………………………………………16
2.2 Exceptional Photographs……………………..…………………..…………………19
2.3 Assigning Blame……………………….……………………………………………29
CHAPTER 3. INVENTING HEROES – IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN
PHOTOGRAPHY’S TOTEMS AND TABOOS……………….………………………40
3.1 Afghanistan……………………………………………………….…………………47
3.2 Iraq…………………………………………………………………………………..63
CHAPTER 4. CONCLUSION: PHOTOGRAPHY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND
EUPHEMISMS…………………………………………………………………………76
BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………..…………………..…….81
VITA…………………………………………………………………………………….91

ii

ABSTRACT
The public saw the wars in Iraq (2003 – 2012) and Afghanistan (2001 – present)
through the lens of reverence and sentimentality toward the soldier. This was manifest
not simply in the catchy “support our troops” rhetoric, but in the one-sided depiction of
the experience of battle by the photojournalists who worked for the major news
organizations in the Western world. From the emotionally bloated to the nationalistic, the
photographs taken by “embedded” photojournalists, whether the result of heavy-handed
censorship or merely political influence, presented a consistent image: the soldier as a
selfless victim of his or her own heroism. This practice stands in stark contrast to the
coverage and reception of the soldiers who fought in Vietnam, and who were often
pictured and treated as inhumane and malicious.
This paper argues that while the strong public opposition to involvement in
Vietnam was largely contingent upon the images that portrayed the soldier as an
unethical and malignant presence, the lessons from Vietnam were, in this case, learned by
the government and media organizations that sought to justify the similar invasive
presence of soldiers in the Middle East. By comparing the common themes and iconic
photographs from the war in Vietnam with those from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,
this paper shows how the newly established cult of the soldier attempted to instill public
support for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, while more critical and violent images,
which formerly helped to galvanize opposition, were edited out
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION: INCOGNITO ACTIVISTS? STOCKHOLM
SYNDROME?
For the past several decades, a specter has been haunting America – the specter of
the Vietnam War. The Vietnamese have long believed that the war dead return to haunt
living. Heonik Kwon, in his book Ghosts of War in Vietnam (2008), used this imagery to
illustrate how the memory of the war continues to be a significant presence in the lives of
the Vietnamese people. But, like Marilyn Young suggested, the Vietnam War was not
just a civil war between the North and South of Vietnam. It was also an American civil
war.1 Never since the actual Civil War had the country been more divided. With this
context in mind, it should come as no surprise that Americans have been haunted by the
specters of the Vietnam War just as the Vietnamese people have been haunted by the
spirits of their war dead.
In fact, this very ghostly analogy has become popular parlance for the continued
effect of the Vietnam War on the American consciousness. For one, the father/daughter
team of Marvin and Deborah Kalb has recently published a book titled Haunting Legacy:
Vietnam and the American Presidency from Ford to Obama (2010). In this far-reaching
1

Marilyn B. Young. “Epilogue: The Vietnam War in American Memory,” in M.E.
Gettleman, J. Franklyn, M.B. Young and H.B. Franklin (eds.), Vietnam and America: A
Documented History (New York: Grove, 1995): 516.
2
Marvin and Deborah Kalb. Haunting Legacy: Vietnam and the American Presidency
from Ford to Obama. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2011): 241
3
Kalb. Haunting Legacy: 292.
4
Vicki Goldberg. The Power of Photography. (New York: Abbeville Publishing Group,
1991).
5
As quoted in Sherry Ricchiardi. “Close to the Action.” American Journalism Review.
(College Park: University System of Maryland Foundation, 2003) Online. Accessed 17
January 2012. http://www.ajr.org/article.asp?id=2991.
6
Andrew Lindner. “Among the Troops: Seeing the Iraq War Through Three Journalistic
Vantage Points.” Social Problems, Vol. 56, No. 1. (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2009): 24.
1
7
As quoted in Ricchiardi. “Close to the Action.”
8
Mike Kamber and Tim Arango. “4,000 U.S. Deaths and a Handful of Images.” The New

work, they trace the depth with which the idea of the Vietnam War has permeated
American politics since the war ended. They show how the Vietnam War has been very
much on everyone’s mind as a precedent for foreign wars in the recent past.
One of the more recent incarnations of the specter of the Vietnam War showed
itself during President Barack Obama’s first National Security Council meeting in
January of 2009. President Obama declared that Afghanistan was not Vietnam.2 It is no
coincidence that General David Patreaus, former commander of the U.S. and NATO
forces in Afghanistan, wrote his doctoral thesis on the military lessons learned in
Vietnam.3 Many precautions were taken to ensure that counter-insurgency struggles in
the Middle East would not result in another “quagmire” like the Vietnam War.
But this specter of the Vietnam War is more than just a frequently cited military
precedent. It was not just a mistake from which war planners have learned valuable
strategy. It remains a ghastly memory always lingering on the horizon. But what made it
so? Why is the American mind haunted with a veteran’s violent post-traumatic
flashbacks? What happened back in Vietnam that continues to live as a specter today?
Photographs are a significant part of the answer to those questions. Vietnam was
photographed and televised more than any previous conflict. The photographs produced
during the Vietnam War were not only numerous, but also high in rhetorical value. The
events of Vietnam themselves were recorded and reported via photojournalism, but the
images of these events became events themselves. On one level they were constantative,
meaning they signified content. On another level, they were also performative. Just like

2

Marvin and Deborah Kalb. Haunting Legacy: Vietnam and the American Presidency
from Ford to Obama. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2011): 241
3
Kalb. Haunting Legacy: 292.
2

performative speech acts, their very presentation was an expressive action, intervening in
actual events.

1.1 Photojournalism as Photonationalism
Photonationalism. What does that ominous neologism mean? Firstly, Vietnam
was a watershed in the history of photography for a number of reasons. War has
consistently been a point of interest for some of the world’s most gifted photographers,
and, in that sense, every war has its iconic images. Photographs from the war in Vietnam,
however, are exceptional because they contradicted many of the commonly accepted
themes and tropes of iconic war photography, especially for Americans. They provided
valuable lessons in the power of photography, to borrow the title of Vicki Goldberg’s
book.4
Some of the most memorable photographs from the Vietnam War look like they
could have been pulled from Goya’s Los Desastres de la Guerra. They functioned then
as they do now, as chilling indictments of violence and the political ideology that
engendered it. These photographs were produced in a large part because of the freedoms
that were granted to journalists during the Vietnam War. Most were independent from
government agencies, roaming the front lines unencumbered and documenting the war as
it appeared before the lens.
Photographs that enter the cultural vernacular become like signs. They lose some
of their nuances and function metonymically for certain ideas. This is why they are called
iconic – an icon as a representative symbol. Photographs characterize war and soldiers in
4

Vicki Goldberg. The Power of Photography. (New York: Abbeville Publishing Group,
1991).
3

general. By the close of the Vietnam War in 1975, several of these photographs-asmetonyms had helped to serve what became a national cause in the U.S. – the antiwar
movement. Many photographs pictured the war as despicable and tragic for those
involved. Moreover, there was unpredictable fallout from these photographs as they
became weapons in the war to win hearts and minds. This is the first meaning of
photonationalism. The photographs were not created as propaganda, yet were usurped to
serve a national ideology.
Photographically speaking, there are several instances where Pentagon-policed
embedding policy has led to photographs that paint the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as
contradictory to the motifs cemented into collective memory by Vietnam War
photography. There are many celebrated photographs that present an overlysentimentalized cult of the soldier, which deliberately subverts notions of the soldier as a
tragic character in favor of the view of the soldier as a compassionate and selfless hero.
This is the second meaning of photonationalism, photographs used to condition a mass
mindset, and to cultivate nationalism and solidarity in spite of precarity and death. Before
delving into the photographs any deeper, some explanation is needed to explain
embedding policy because it had a significant affect on the mobility of photographers.

1.2 “Embedding” Photojournalists
Photojournalists documenting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were not granted
the kind of unfiltered access that photojournalists were in Vietnam. After abundant
criticism for the heavy-handed censorship during the first Gulf War, government officials
settled on what was billed as a less-restrictive policy. Photojournalists who wanted to

4

document the conflicts were required to be embedded within a group of soldiers or
stationed at a press base in a capital city. Unlike the photographers of the Gulf War, these
men and women were granted real time access to the conflicts as they unfolded.
However, soon after this policy was put into place it drew wide criticism for influencing
the content of the news images.
Embedding photographers and journalists with troops in Iraq came first as a relief.
Precious few had been granted access to the war in Afghanistan and many were thankful
for the doors that were being slowly opened in Iraq, confident that similar policies would
follow in Afghanistan. In 2003, a Los Angeles Times media critic was one of the vocal
supporters of the embedding policy, insisting that journalists and photographers were
being granted “a rare window on war.”5
As photographs began to emerge in the news, biting criticism was levied at
embedded journalists and at the policy in general. Many journalists were deemed unable
to capture the war in a fair and balanced light because they were presumed to suffer from
a kind of “Stockholm syndrome.”6 The suggestion that embedded photojournalists
inevitably suffer from a kind of Stockholm syndrome insinuates that the objectivity of
their lens had been compromised by their consistent point of view. Since embedded
photojournalists are guarded by a specific group of soldiers for a long period of time, they
grow attached, and they can no longer report on them in an unbiased manner. Of those
who remained in stalwart opposition to embedding policy, Alex S. Jones, director of
5

As quoted in Sherry Ricchiardi. “Close to the Action.” American Journalism Review.
(College Park: University System of Maryland Foundation, 2003) Online. Accessed 17
January 2012. http://www.ajr.org/article.asp?id=2991.
6
Andrew Lindner. “Among the Troops: Seeing the Iraq War Through Three Journalistic
Vantage Points.” Social Problems, Vol. 56, No. 1. (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2009): 24.
5

Harvard’s Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics, and Public Policy is a
paradigmatic example. He critiqued the content produced by embedded journalists,
suggesting that it was propagandistic and that it appeared to be “one magnificent
recruitment video” for military life.7
On some level, a consistent point of view is to be expected of photojournalists.
The dominant subjects of war photographs produced by embedded journalists are no
different. Predictably, embedded war photographers predominantly feature the soldiers
with whom they are on assignment. This subject alone is not new. The soldier has been a
popular and recurring character in the history of photography. From Crimea to the World
Wars, during Vietnam and still today, photographs of soldiers in combat give the public
relatable persons though whom the war experience can be filtered and to whom
compassion can be bestowed. However, the positive connotation of recent war
photographs warrants interrogation.
Mike Kamber and Tim Arango have connected the positive swing in combat
photographs, as well as the absence of photographs of American casualties in the Iraq
War, directly to embedding policy. Likewise, they have reported that the absence of
particularly damning photographs stands in direct contrast, and perhaps even in reaction,
to coverage of the Vietnam War:
If the conflict in Vietnam was notable for open access given to journalists – too
much, many critics said, as the war played out nightly in bloody newscasts – the
Iraq war may mark an opposite extreme: after five years and more than 4,000
American combat deaths, searches and interviews turned up fewer than a halfdozen graphic photographs of dead American soldiers.8
7

As quoted in Ricchiardi. “Close to the Action.”
Mike Kamber and Tim Arango. “4,000 U.S. Deaths and a Handful of Images.” The New
York Times. Online. 26 June 2008. Accessed 17 March 2012.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/26/world/middleeast/26censor.html.
8
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In this report, Kamber and Arango note several instances when the photography of the
dead or dying led to expulsion of the responsible photojournalists from their embed. The
official reasons given for the expulsions were often cloaked in bureaucracy. Nonetheless,
the intentions of military officials to control the content of the images is obvious. For
example, Robert Nickelsburg was forbidden to work in military zones in Iraq after
publishing a photograph of a soldier who, though not dead at the time of his
photographing, died later of his wounds. Nickelsburg was expelled for breaking the
embed rule of not obtaining written permission from the wounded soldier.9
While embedded with the U.S. military himself, Kamber was not just unable to
photograph certain scenes because of military censorship. Susan Roa reported of one
incident where Kamber was reprimanded on site for photographing a tragic scene:
One day during his time embedded, Kamber’s unit was attacked by an IED. After
a quick recovery from the debris, Kamber began to photograph but the unit
captain yelled out to him “no pictures!” Kamber replied, “I’m here to do my job
and you can take my cameras later.” The U.S. military later warned the New York
Times not to publish the photos and also threatened to revoke the paper’s embed
access. Mr. Kamber and his editors dug through the images from that day and
tried to conform to the military’s requirements. The graphic images were left
unpublished.10
With situations like those Kamber described and experienced, it is evident that the
government and U.S. Military learned the lessons of the Vietnam War with regard to war
photography.

9

Kamber and Arango. “4,000 U.S. Deaths…”
Susan Roa. “Mike Kamber: Military Censorship.” BagNewsNotes.com Online. 14
October 2012. Accessed 24 April 2012. http://www.bagnewsnotes.com/2010/10/mikekamber-military-censorship/.
10
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1.3 Photography, Public Opinion, and Political Ideology
Frequently, photographs of soldiers function metonymically, standing in for the
wars themselves. This is one of the reasons some photographs are called iconic – an icon
as a representative symbol. They characterize war and soldiers in general. Ideologically
speaking, this photographic metonymy is ripe for appropriation by whichever political
group finds the content particularly apt. Very plainly speaking, this is how photographs
of soldiers committing ethically reprehensible acts in Vietnam after the Tet Offensive
began to serve the anti-war cause, as if the photographer’s themselves were incognito
activists.
Even when photographers are in the right place at the right time, historic events
do not always yield historic photographs. However, it might be correct to say that historic
photographs do stir historic sentiments. Photojournalism is not necessarily at its most
powerful and its most historic when it acts as a window into a unique and yet-unseen time
or place. It is also powerful and historic when it acts as a mirror, accurately reflecting the
identity of the society that employed it for facticity and meaning. Or, as Barbie Zelizer
has put it, when photographs connote as well as denote.
If one were to accept briefly that photojournalism was hinged directly upon public
opinion, one would expect the content produced during the Vietnam War and the Iraq
War to be consistent. Why? The Vietnam War and the war in Iraq shared a similar
dramatic decline in public opinion well before the wars ended. Afghanistan has a
different story. Gallup poles show that until recently the public felt that the U.S. was

8

justified in its continued presence in Afghanistan. 11 In Iraq on the other hand, public
opinion dropped dramatically as early as 2005. This rate was even faster than the decline
of public support for Vietnam in the late ‘60s and early ‘70s.12 The opposition to the war
in Vietnam became a majority in August of 1968, and continued steadily upward through
the war’s end.
The relationship between the emergence of particularly damning photographs of
war is the inverse of what might be expected from the comparison of public opinion.
When public opinion began to sour on the Vietnam War in the late ‘60s and early ‘70s,
sensational photographs cropped up as well, as if the photojournalists felt a responsibility
to reinforce those sentiments. What are the iconic photographs from Iraq and Afghanistan
that would match the fervor of protest? Arguably, there are none from Afghanistan. The
Abu Ghraib archive was accidentally revealed and curbed the support of a large majority
of Americans. Yet that was a different case entirely. Casual snapshots are not the product
of photojournalists looking for news. It is well known that neither the war in Iraq nor the
war in Afghanistan has been without blemishes, even when Abu Ghraib is excluded from
consideration.
In the August 11, 2011 issue of the New York Times Sunday Review, William
Deresiewicz asked explicitly what I am implying. Although he confessed to sincerely
doubting there has been an Iraqi equivalent to the massacre at My Lai, he cited a few
instances of gross American war misconduct: the prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib, the gang
11

Jeffrey Jones. “New High Call Afghanistan War a Mistake.” Gallup. Online. 03
August 2010. Accessesd 01 December 2011. http://www.gallup.com/poll/141716/newhigh-call-afghanistan-war-mistake.aspx.
12
Frank Newport and Joseph Carol. “Iraq Versus Vietnam, a Comparison of Public
Opinion.” Gallup. Online. 24 August 2005. Accessed 01 December 2011.
http://www.gallup.com/poll/18097/iraq-versus-vietnam-comparison-public-opinion.aspx.
9

rape at Mahmudiya, and the civilian massacre by the 5th Stryker Brigade. What did he see
as the difference between these three atrocities? “Only the first (Abu Ghraib) has been
widely discussed, likely because there were pictures. How many more of these have there
been? Maybe none, maybe a significant number: until we ask – until we want to ask –
we’ll never know.”13
Deresciewicz is on to two important things here. First, that there are cases of gross
war “misconduct,” and second that they are only recognized as such when there are
images. Images of atrocity are especially threatening to idealistic metanarratives that
purport a clean and moral war because they directly contradict it. As Dereciewicz
implies, when we see some images of atrocity, even if they are few in number, we are
able to assume that they are just the tips of the iceberg. The war in Iraq was marred with
incidents that were caught on the personal cameras of those involved and were thus
outside of the long arms of government and big media regulation. This is not really the
case with Afghanistan. Although the absence of atrocious images does not necessarily
account for the public support for a war, the presence of images of atrocity can account
on some level for its lack of support. However, the question returns, whether we can
blame embedding for this ostensible absence.
The relationship between photographs and the public is neither univocal nor is it
unidirectional. While the content of certain photographs may have an influence on the
public’s interpretation of events like war, the public’s interpretation of events likewise
affects how the content of photographs is viewed. Such is the case with photographs that
13

Deresiewicz, William. “An Empty Regard.” The New York Times Sunday Review,
August 20, 2011, accessed August 29, 2011.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/21/opinion/sunday/americas-sentimental-regard-forthe-military.html?_r=1&ref=opinion&pagewanted=all.
10

depict soldiers. While soldiers metonymically signify war, war often inadvertently
characterizes soldiers.

1.4 Organization and Methods
If the message of the photographs from the Vietnam War can be interpreted as
consistently anti-war, how are images from Iraq and Afghanistan to be interpreted? The
story has been overwhelmingly one of liberation – gallant hero soldiers enduring
hardships, becoming victims themselves to release the innocent from the grip of despotic
rule. While photographs from the Vietnam War remind us continually of the
meaninglessness of war, photographs from Iraq and Afghanistan frequently harken back
to the war’s impetus; it’s emotionally wrought, entirely justifiable purpose. Most fall
tragically in line with the official nationalistic mindset cultivated by “Support our
Troops” rhetoric.
The following section, SYMBOLIZING EVIL - VIETNAM, will go into
greater detail about how conflict photographs from the war in Vietnam imagined war
metonymically via the image of the soldier. I will discuss the dialectics of content and
connotation that made these photographs anti-war photographs. I will further argue that
photographic metonymy functions in two ways: while photographs of soldiers negatively
characterized the war, the war also negatively characterized the soldiers.
In the third section, INVENTING HEROES – IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN, I
will delineate the different ways in which the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were
photographed as “not Vietnam.” With Afghanistan, I will analyze photographs produced
by embedded journalists that harken back to the impetus of the war (something Vietnam

11

notoriously lacked), 9/11, and the changed connotation of victimization in those
photographs. I will analyze embedded journalists’ photographs of the war in Iraq that
point to the goal of the war, its anterior limit – the rescue of the helpless Iraqis from the
tyrant Saddam Hussein, and the making of hero soldiers. I will pay specific attention
throughout to images that are totems, rallying points that recall an archaic sense of
patriotism, and those that are taboo.
In conclusion, I will consider the relationship between the two alternative
problems of photography exemplified by the two historical periods discussed (the
Vietnam war, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan). I will address the ethical problems
inherent in a medium that assumes the mantle of objectivity, and I will approach the
question of responsibility when it concerns taking and showing photographs.
Throughout, I treat photographs as artworks. How can I do this? Photographs that
end up on the front pages of newspapers do not get there solely by virtue of the events
they depict. Choices are made – first by the photographer when he or she shoots the
images, second by the editor who picks from all the images shot, third by the viewing
public who celebrates certain images more than others. All these choices are influenced
by the myriad of iconography, connotation, style, tone encapsulated in the images – in
short, these are aesthetic choices, the same kind of choices made by artists who use more
traditional art media to communicate. For these reasons, I interpret the photographs in
terms of their iconography, composition, and their political function separate from the
actual events they depict.
I have organized the following chapters based firstly upon the topics I wanted to
cover, and secondly upon chonology. So in that sense, I am writing firstly about

12

photography, and I am concerned primarily about how the qualities of photography and
the politics of war affect the interpretation of images. Throughout, I also draw parallels
between language and photography. I do this through word choice, using words like
“tropes,” “metonyms,” “signifiers,” and “rhetoric” to encourage the reader to understand
photographs as visual constructs with meaning rather than as records of events. I also
compare specific, often vulgar, photographs to the specific, often vulgar, language of
pundits in order to further call into question the notion of unbiased photography.
There are profound differences between the way photographs were presented to
the public during the Vietnam War and the way photographs are presented today. The
primary means of image consumption during the 1960s and 1970s were print media and
television. Today we have a third means that often trumps the other two – the Internet. In
order to maintain a consistent criteria, I limit my discussion to images that were printed in
nationally reputable publications. For those images that I discuss as “iconic,” I consulted
three archives which contain award winning photographs from the years of the Vietnam
War all the way through to today: the World Press Photo archive, the Picture of the Year
International Archive, and the Pulitzer Prize archive.

13

CHAPTER 2. SYMBOLIZING EVIL – VIETNAM: THE (UNINTENDED?)
POWER OF PARTICULARLY DAMNING IMAGES
Just as the events of the Vietnam War forever altered the American understanding
of war, the images from the Vietnam War established a previously-unexpected visual
system. The iconic photographs from Vietnam stand now as a historical turning point
where previously there was none. If the invocations of the Vietnam War signal disdain, a
shameful pockmark on the face of American history, what then does the image of the
Vietnam War signify? How do the photographs of the Vietnam War haunt
photojournalism and American culture?
War has never been clean or pretty. Gunther Lewy has argued that the Vietnam
War was not dirtier or uglier than conflicts in the past. In one example, he reminded us
that napalm, a source of many Vietnam horror stories, was simply a more advanced use
of fire, which itself was an ancient weapon of war.14 On one level, the fact that these
photographs brought horrors that were common on the battlefield to American’s
breakfast tables made them exceptional.
War is an ethically ambiguous practice. Most people would consider it foolish to
assume that Vietnam was the first war with so-called collateral damage. What made this
collateral damage utterly despicable in Vietnam was the confluence of special
circumstances that existed in the climate of the American understanding of the war.
Young Americans in the prime of their lives were being drafted to a tiny country in
Southeast Asia to fight a war against the specter of the time – the specter of communism.
However, this combination of a lack of real and tangible threat, coupled with the fact that
14

Guenther Lewy. “Vietnam: New Light on the Question of American Guilt.”
Commentary, 65, no. 2 (February 1978): 49.
14

so many Americans were dying for it,
created a volatile climate. So, when
photographs published in newspapers
depicted the shameful acts of war rather
than pride-inspiring acts of heroism, they
only served to further galvanize public
Fig. 1 - Co Rentmeester, Getty Images,
October 1966

opposition to the conflict.
If 1965 was the year when
America’s political leaders made their full
commitment to the war in Vietnam, it was
also the year when the protest movement
fully came together.15 Prior to 1965, public
opposition was isolated to fringe activists
and relatively ineffectual demonstrations.

Fig. 2 - Unattributed, 1944

But as more troops were harvested from
their homes to occupy the jungles of South

Vietnam, the many who opposed the war found a more legitimate voice. Nancy Zaroulis
and George Sullivan, in their detailed chronicle of the protest movement, mark 1965 as

15

By May of 1965, there would be 50,000 American troops on the ground in South
Vietnam. This dramatic increase was an attempt by Lyndon Johnson to “get things
bubbling” after Vietcong aggression earlier in the year. Part of this ramped up aggression
was the Rolling Thunder campaign advocated by National Security Advisor McGeorge
Bundy. Rolling Thunder was a plan of continuous helicopter bombardment of the North
Vietnamese encampments. See James S. Olsen and Randy Roberts. Where the Domino
Fell: America and Vietnam. Revised 5th Edition. (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2006):
128.
15

the moment of the watershed because “the events of that year contained all the elements
for the drama that would be played again and again in the next seven years.”16

2.1 Standard Photographs
In many ways, and for much of the war before the Tet Offensive in 1968,
photographs that were published by major news magazines conformed largely to the
standard and predictable illustration of war. What is a so-called standard photograph?
Can there be such a thing? Photographs depict events that by their very definition are
unique to a time and to a place. But are all “events worthy of their name?”17
Consider Co Rentmeester’s October 1966 photograph of General Westmoreland
inspecting the soldiers of the 1st Infantry Division (Fig. 1) against the iconic photograph
of Lieutenant General George S. Patton reviewing his troops in 1944 (Fig. 2) near the end
of World War II. Each depicts exactly the same type of “event:” the unity of the troops
under the direct supervision of their highest ranked superiors. They are pictures of
military might. They feature the strength of the numbers and the attentiveness of military
leadership. They are the overwrought scenes in epic war movies when the heroic leader’s
voice hurls an inspirational battle cry to the innumerable and excitable masses.
16

Zaroulis and Sullivan: 67.
“What is an event worthy of this name? And a major event that is, one that is actually
more of an event, more actually an event than ever? An event that would bear witness, in
an exemplary or hyperbolic fashion, to the very essence of an event or even to an event
beyond essence? For could an event that still conforms to an essence, to a law or to a
truth, indeed to a concept of the event, ever be a major event? A major event should be so
unforeseeable and irruptive that it disturbs even the horizon of the concept or essence on
the basis of which we believe we recognize an event as such. That is why all the
“philosophical” questions remain open, perhaps even beyond philosophy itself, as soon as
it is a matter of thinking the event.” Giovanna Borradori. Philosophy in a Time of Terror:
Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida. (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2003): 90.
17

16

There are a few things worth noting in this photograph of Gen. Westmoreland.
First, Westmoreland stands taller than everything else in the composition, even though a
dramatic perspective does not overtly exaggerate his height. Second, the rigid dynamism
of the verticals points to Westmoreland’s thick forearm and fist. If this were a painting, it
would be easy to assume that the artist was deliberately using these compositional
devices as an allegory for Westmoreland’s masculine power as a general. Lastly, all the
arms of the soldiers mirror Westmoreland’s. They share the rigidity and strength of his
convictions. In this case, compositional devices project the image of an omnipotent
commander, and the literal and figurative strength of arms.
In hindsight, we can recognize
these as easily decipherable symbols,
even naïve implications, considering
the current historical understanding
of the war in Vietnam. Some of the
most significant military failures in
Vietnam were directly related to the
rigid structure and hierarchical

Fig. 3 – Horst Faas, Associated Press, 1966

organization that is accentuated in
this photo. The jungle landscape and guerrilla enemy prevented a fortified assault by the
kind of regimented troops that are congratulated in this photograph. In today’s light, the
normalcy of this photograph speaks to a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of
the Vietnam War in its early years.

17

Another example is Horst Faas’ photograph of Gen. Westmoreland talking with
troops near Ben Hoa in 1966 (Fig. 3). This is also a very standard photograph from the
Vietnam War with respect to the history of war photographs. It participates in the
common illustration of the common characters of war, fulfilling commonly accepted
roles. Some might even go as far as to say that these are cliché photographs of war. They
give no real context; they establish nothing exceptionally unique to time or even to place.
They show the ways in which the Vietnam War was just like every other war.
These photographs, like the others, with our present day historical understanding,
read as almost farcical. Westmoreland is discussing the war with ground troops here. The
leaders of the war effort in Vietnam frequently considered reports from the troops
negligible, and by the late ‘60s were roundly and routinely criticized in the press for that
fact. In today’s light, the normalcy of this photograph represents a fundamental
misunderstanding of the nature of the Vietnam War in its early years
rather than an accepted trope of war. Photographs that attempt to
posit clichés of war onto actual wars misrepresent their nuanced and
specific characters. That misrepresentation is fairly easy to see in
cliché war photographs.
As early as January of 1968, the problematic fictions told to
the public by the government were beginning to crumble. The nownotorious Tet Offensive was in full swing by the end of the month
and Americans had suffered too many casualties in attempting to
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Fig. 4 Unattributed,
LIFE Magazine,
1861

hold back the Vietcong guerillas, who, by the January 31, had already temporarily
overrun the U.S. Embassy in Saigon.18 The paradoxical logic employed by U.S. military
reports showed itself. Associated Press Correspondent Peter Arnett reported the
oxymoron employed by an anonymous major to defend U.S. strategy: “It became
necessary to destroy the town to save it.”19 Even prior to the major swing in public
opinion, certain photo essays were subtly prescient of public sentiments to come. As
LIFE Magazine put it recently, the photographers in Vietnam
in the early 1960s were able to “[anticipate] the scope and the
dire, lethal arc of the entire war in Vietnam.”20

2.2 Exceptional Photographs
In one significant respect, many photographs broke
from those simple, “standard,” conventional clichés of war
photography even before 1968 by depicting the soldier as
emotionally unprepared rather than stable and gallant.21

Fig. 5 - Larry Burrows,
LIFE Magazine, 1965

Consider the photograph of Lance Corporeal James C. Farley at the end of a photo essay,
One Ride With Yankee Papa 13, shot for LIFE Magazine by Larry Burrows (Fig. 5).
There is no solidity here, no rigid strength of form to insinuate a rigid strength in
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convictions like photographs of soldiers taking aim or regiments marching. Instead, there
are collapsed diagonals – broken forms and despair.
Despite the fact that this was a conscientious and realistic portrait series of Farley,
it still paints him as contrary to the archetypical soldier. He is shown as neither gallant
nor brave, but instead as a child who, psychologically at least, does not belong in a war
zone. This treatment of Farley speaks as a metaphor for the conflict at large. Americans
prematurely rushed into a foreign country and were ill prepared for the type of war they
were to encounter. Burrow’s photographs of Farley personified this embarrassing
circumstance.
A misconception about photographs of the
Vietnam War is that they were exceptional simply
because they depicted sadness, violence, and even
the mangled bodies of the dead as opposed to hope
and glory. However, the difference isn’t simply a
matter of polarity between positive photos and
negative photos. Sadness, violence, death, despair –
these have long been themes of photography, and
most photographs exhibiting these themes aren’t

Fig. 6 - Robert Morse, LIFE
Magazine, 1943

considered exceptional or iconic. In fact, rather than
standing as metonyms for war, they were considered profane because they seemed to
disturb the sanctity of death, or the honor of a soldier.
LIFE Magazine was permitted by government censors to print photographs of
dead enemies (and dead Americans only a year later) as early as 1943, a quarter century
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before the My Lai massacre. Robert Morse’s photograph of the screaming skull of the
Japanese soldier (Fig. 6) is the only photograph of an enemy dead that comes close to
being culturally significant, and that cultural significance only has to do with the backlash
from publishing the image that forced LIFE to defend its policy to disturbed readers.
LIFE received letters from readers complaining about Morse’s photograph, and
responded, “War is unpleasant, cruel, and inhuman. It is more dangerous to forget this
than to be shocked by reminders.”22
One important difference between photographs of the Vietnam War and
photographs from previous wars was how the photographs presented death and pain – in
the moment rather than after the fact. To partially explain this, Susan Moeller has made
the connection between photojournalists working in Vietnam and the popularity of the
street photographer aesthetic of the 1950s and 1960s practiced by Robert Frank, Lee
Freidlander, and Gary Winograd: “Instead of careful compositions isolating decisive
moments of combat, the images that seemed to dominate and characterize the bulk of the
photographs from Vietnam appeared simply to arrest randomly selected scenes – random,
yet all the more significant for their seeming representativeness precisely because they
were ‘random.’”23 Although ultimately tainted by the photographer’s subjectivity, shotfrom-the-hip photographs are perceived as more authentically objective because of the
lack of control over the image. The content is interpreted as being untainted by the
photographer’s intentions precisely because the photographer snapped the photograph
spontaneously and without deliberate forethought.
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Eddie Adams’ famed photograph of Gen. Loan executing the Viet Cong prisoner
(Fig. 7) is the quintessential photograph of the event being captured in the moment, rather
than after the fact. It is the frozen
moment, the mystical property of
photography typified. This is not a
photograph of death as an
accomplished fact. It is a
photograph of certain and
impending death and of the agony in

Fig. 7 - Eddie Adams, Associated Press, 1968

knowing death-is-to-come, but not
yet. It was a specific event, an ugly event, and it was also a celebrated icon capable of
characterizing the Vietnam War in general, despite its specificity. Why?
This face of death was self-reflective for much of the viewing public. It was as if,
like Narcissus, they had finally recognized themselves in the image of the execution.
They were horrified as the knowledge of their prolonged impotence was realized. When
Thierry De Duve wrote of this photograph that viewer’s experience was traumatic not
because of the depiction of violence, but because of the “paradoxical conjunction of the
here and the formerly,” he meant that the viewer experienced being “always be too late,
in real life, to witness the death of this poor man, let alone to prevent it; but by the same
token, always be too early to witness the uncoiling of the tragedy, which at the surface of
the photograph, will of course never occur.”24
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When looking at this photograph contemporaneously, the slippage to the symbolic
was inevitable. The viewers were too late to stop the violence of war in general, yet were
frozen in hellish ineptitude and were
unable to realize the true nature of its
crisis, mirroring their inabilities to
affect or accept the Vietcong’s
demise. At this point in 1968,
experiencing the fallout from the Tet
Offensive, Americans were at once

Fig. 8 - Unattributed, German Federal Archive,
1945

passionately hopeful that they could
make the war end, and hopelessly
unable to end it. The same is true
with all of those photographs that
broke from precedent to symbolize
Vietnam – they became iconic,
because they mirrored and reinforced
a preexisting public sentiment.
Another important way that

Fig. 9 - Art Workers Coalition, And Babies
poster based on the photograph by Ron
Haeberle, 1970

Vietnam War photographs broke from precedent is that these images functioned in the
sphere of culture. The photographs of the piles of dead from the aftermath of the Dresden
bombings during WWII (Fig. 8), when published in the postwar world, drew cries of
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outrage and accusations of indecency.25 Photographs from My Lai on the other hand
successfully made the massacre a cause célèbre for those who would condemn the war,
despite their vulgarity. They were coopted as propaganda art.
Even in their time, the photographs from My Lai were quickly associated with
timeless indictments of war. Shortly after the release of the photos, the Art Workers
Coalition appropriated Ron
Haeberle’s photograph from My Lai
to act as a protest poster (Fig. 9).
Frazer Dougherty, Irving Petlin, and
Jon Hendricks designed the poster to
illustrate a quote from an interview
with CBS’s Mike Wallace and Paul

Fig. 10 - Unattributed, Associated Press, 1970

Meadlo, a soldier who had taken part
in the massacre. Hovering above Haeberle’s image of the bodies of Vietnamese peasants
in the road, the poster reads “Q. And babies? A. And babies,” indicating that not even the
very young were spared from the brutality. The Museum of Modern Art had promised to
fund the posters, but the board reversed the their decision at the last minute in an effort to
avoid the Vietnam War polemic. In protest, the Art Workers Coalition printed the posters
with the help of the lithography union, stormed the museum, and displayed and
distributed the posters beneath Picasso’s Guernica (Fig. 10).26

25

For a recent example, see Luke Harding. “German historian provokes row over war
photos.” The Guardian. Online. 21 October 2003. Accessed 03 April 2012.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/oct/21/artsandhumanities.germany
26
M. Paul Holsinger. War and American Popular Culture. (Greenwood Publishing
Group, 1999): 363.
24

Photographs, in this way, are very tricky. There are two levels of trust that the
public puts into photographs. One is in their denotation, the event depicted – that what is
depicted is what had been as Roland Barthes famously termed it, and that the referent is
actually what is signified by the photographic sign. However, the other contradicts the
first almost entirely. Content frequently yields to connotation. The content of a
photograph can be deemed untrustworthy. Perhaps for example, it excludes some
significant factor from the frame. Nonetheless, the connotation attributed to that
misleading content is frequently trusted, lasting.27
Eddie Adam’s photograph of the Vietcong execution is a prime example of the
influence of connotation. Throughout his life, Adams felt he had framed the content in a
way that led the viewer to sympathize with the wrong soldier. Margot Adler of National
Public Radio explains in an article eulogizing Adam’s life and career that he
considered himself a patriot and a Marine, [and] never came to terms with the
fact that the anti-war movement saw that photograph as proof that the Vietnam
War was unjustified. In fact, he believed to the end of his life that the picture
only told part of the truth. The untold story was that on the day of the execution,
an aid to Loan was killed by insurgents. After Loan pulled the trigger, he walked
by Adams and said, “They killed many of our people and many of yours.”28
On the surface, the impact was positive because photographs from the Vietnam
War helped to quicken the end of a war that cost countless lives. The impact is
nonetheless problematic because when a photograph is translated from the specific,
detailed, and eventful to the general, universal, and connoted; nuances are lost in the
process of interpretation just as they were in cliché photographs. The thing depicted –
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soldiers as unsoldierly – also
connoted war as horrible. In the
process of making a generalized
interpretation, there is also a laying
of blame, and an implication of
responsibility. If we see that war is
horrible because we see soldiers

Fig. 11 - Peter Arnett, Associated Press, 1966

committing unsoldierly acts, it must be the soldiers
who are making the war horrible. What is cut out of
this circular reasoning is of utmost importance.
We consistently see the soldier-as-unsoldierly
trope when looking at the celebrated, iconic
photographs that illustrate the Vietnam War. In
addition to being the year that marked an increased
American military presence in Vietnam, 1965 was
also defined by the first destruction of Vietnamese
peasant hamlets by systematic burning. As these
ethically questionable activities began, they were

Fig. 12 - Kyochi Sawada,
United Press International,
1966

reported through the character of the soldier. Peter
Arnett’s photograph of the U.S. paratrooper walking away after torching a straw hut (Fig.
11) is interesting because of the paratrooper’s cold, emotionless expression as he walks
away from the flames. It represents the lack of consciousness with which operation
“Scorched Earth” was executed.
26

Similarly, Kyoichi Sawada’s photograph of a U.S. armored vehicle dragging the
body of a Vietcong enemy through the streets (Fig. 12) is marked both by the horrible act
and the soldiers who seem un-phased by the brutality of their behavior. The photograph,
often called “Dusty Death,” was taken in Tan Binh in late February of 1966 and was
awarded a first prize for news in 1966 by World Press Photo. Tan Binh was not the site
of a brutal struggle or a climactic battle in the war. The soldiers were sent there to build a
road under operation “Rollingstone.” They met opposition, but it was quickly squelched.
These soldiers took the site in the battle of Suoi Bong Trang on February 23 and
24. U.S. and Australian troops clashed with Vietcong guerillas, and, in keeping with
typical Vietcong tactics, most of the Vietcong retreated into the wilderness once the
fighting became heated. American casualties numbered 11, with 74 wounded, while the
Vietcong lost at least 142 fighters.29 Sawada snapped the photo in the aftermath of this
battle. The Vietcong never attempted to retake the site, choosing instead to simply annoy
Americans with occasional sniper and mortar fire. The road was completed by the
beginning of March.30 Without diminishing the gravity of the loss of lives, it is safe to say
that this was a relatively routine and successful endeavor. At the very least, it was not the
kind of endeavor that would warrant an especially acerbic animosity from the Americans.
And yet, Sawada’s photograph shows U.S. soldiers unabashedly dragging the
body of a Vietcong enemy through the street. Any image of a dead body speaks on some
level to the horrors of war, but when this dead body is seen in conjunction with the
soldiers nonchalance, the effect is even more chilling. The responsibility for perpetuating
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this kind of brutality falls on the two
men driving the armored vehicle,
regardless of their actual role. In the
photograph, the parading of the corpse
appears completely unwarranted. The
armored vehicle looks large enough to
tow a car, and it seems impractical to
move a body in this way. The only

Fig. 13 - Nick Ut, Associated Press, 1972

conclusion left for the viewer to draw
from this photograph is that these
soldiers are needlessly violent and
inhumane.
The same is true of Nick Ut’s
famous photograph of the naked,
napalm burned Kim Phuc from 1972,
much later in the war (Fig. 13). The

Fig. 14 - James Haddock, Kim Phuc and
other Vietnamese flee napalm (Trang Bang,
Vietnam, 1972), Digital C-Print, 2000

presence of the strolling soldiers behind
the panicked children are what make the photograph an image of lapsed ethics and not
just an image of a war horror. Robert Hariman and John Louis Lucaites share my
diagnosis that the presence of indifferent soldiers in the image changes its rhetorical
value. Of Ut’s image, they wrote
The message is clear: what seems, from looking at the girl, to be a rare experience
sure to evoke a compassionate response, is in fact, as experienced by the soldiers,
something that happens again and again, so much so that the adults involved
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(whether soldiers there or civilians in the United States) can become indifferent,
morally diminished, capable of routinely doing awful things to other people. 31
For these reasons, they find that the image of the napalmed girl strikes at a national nerve.
While the uncensored rawness of the girls scream is jarring to the viewing public, the
soldiers are featured as callous to her cries. The meaning of this photograph is interpreted
and politically polarized based on the context.
John Haddock, an American digital artist, completed a series of so-called
screenshots in 2001 that reconstruct historical events as if they were being played in a
video game. His reconstruction of the events depicted in Ut’s photograph also stresses the
presence of the carefree soldiers (Fig. 14). Where the composition of Ut’s photograph
features Kim Phuc prominently, his screenshot from above allows the soldiers to
dominate the frame. Hariman and Lucaites read the reconstructed image as Phuc running
from the soldiers rather than from the pain of her burns.

2.3 Assigning Blame
By 1972 when Ut’s image was taken and published, the public no longer had
illusions about the direction the war had taken. The protest movement had become a
prominent element in national news, especially since the Kent State shooting in May of
1970. But even before that, because of the worldwide protests in 1968, the American
news media had shifted coverage to predominantly negative sentiments. Daniel Hallin
noted that up until 1967, the press and the pro-war government rarely clashed. He found
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that not only was the media relatively “docile,” but that official positions on the war
dominated the headlines.32 After 1968, however, coverage had shifted to “growing
divisions in Washington, declining morale among American troops in the field, and the
spread of the antiwar movement into parts of the political mainstream.”33
It is hard not to look at any photograph from the Vietnam War as an anti-war
photograph. Even at their most innocuous, a sense of hopelessness or futility lies behind
photographs taken during the war in Vietnam. They are retroactively colored by the
tainted cultural memory of the war. That tainted cultural memory is not just contingent
upon the facts and results of the war, but upon images of war that portray it at its most
egregious. These particularly damning photographs were not just inevitably connoted;
they were also inevitably problematic. As the Winter Soldier Investigation attempted to
clarify, soldiers were often unjustly blamed for the war crimes of the administration.
Since the images functioned metonymically, the soldiers themselves signified and
embodied the unjust nature of the war, and often were made to unfairly bear the burden
of the war’s legacy upon returning.
This inappropriate blaming of the soldiers was noted by the press before the
publication of what became the iconic photographs of Vietnam, but it did not stick until
most of those major and damning photographs were published. This perception, this
laying of blame, was not necessarily a situation that existed in a direct and causal way,
but was rather assumed to exist by the polemicists battling for public opinion. The
soldiers were involved because of the central position of the image of the soldier in the
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debates about the ethicality of the war. On one hand, soldiers did not appreciate being
used. On the other, the anti-war movement was portrayed as being against the soldier.
“It became necessary to destroy the town in order to save it.” That particular
sentiment would become utterly vile to most when news of the My Lai massacre broke in
1969. The event took place a mere two months after the anonymous Major’s assessment
of Ben Tre. My Lai matched the memorable quote’s rhetoric with a more direct and
blatant application of its implied strategy: to save the peasants from the tyranny of
Hanoi’s communism, they must be slaughtered.
My Lai has become notorious only because of the photographs taken by U.S.
Army Photographer Robert Haeberle. The story of the events that took place at My Lai
was initially unheard until LIFE Magazine published Haeberle’s images after they
surfaced in the Cleveland Plain Dealer some 18 months later.34 During the Tet Offensive
back in May of 1968, the Charlie Company had been sent into what they thought was a
stronghold of enemy combatants in an area of the Quang Ngai province, named
“Pinkville” by the U.S. military. When the soldiers arrived and found only civilians, they
slaughtered them – an estimated 350-500 people.
The photographs are unique specimens because they provide such a
comprehensive record of the carnage. But again, the photographs did not just depict the
aftermath of violence. It is important to note that the photographs were of soldiers caught
red-handed as agents of that violence. Haeberle didn’t just photograph the now-infamous
bodies in the street that was appropriated by the Art Workers’ Coalition for their And
Babies poster. Interspersed among the graphic images of slain civilians are photographs

34

American Experience: 22-23.
31

of soldiers acting destructively. As the
number of bloody bodies in the photographs
increased, images of soldiers are slipped in
between, showing them ravaging the village
(Fig. 15). One photograph features two
soldiers dumping domestic possessions into
a muddy ditch. Another shows a soldier
lighting the grass roof of a domicile on fire.
A third pictures a soldier dramatically
hurling round thatched mats into the already
burning structure. The last and possibly most
disturbing image is of the soldiers in the
Charlie Company enjoying a break after the

Fig. 15 - Page 4 of the Cleveland Plain
Dealer, November 20, 1969

destruction of the entire village.
Historian James Olsen remarked that these photographs have become
“ubiquitous” in that they “symbolize evil.”35 Images like these alter the identity of the
soldier in American culture’s collective memory. The soldier as a character is obviously
no longer a hero fighting for American ideals. Moreover, the soldier was not even an
ineffectual and unprepared child, like Farley in Burrow’s series. He has become, for
Olsen and others, the personification of the evils of war rather than the embodiment of its
glories.

35

American Experience: My Lai. DVD. Directed by Barak Goodman. (Public
Broadcasting Service, 2010).
32

When John Smail, one of the squad leaders of the Charlie Company who was
responsible for the events, overheard the news break about My Lai, he feared for his
safety. The patrons of the bar in which he was sitting were screaming “fucking baby
killers” at the television.36 This image conjured by Smail became a common trope in the
final years of the war and in the years that followed. In the case of specific soldiers like
Smail who had committed those crimes, they were coopted to symbolize the despicable
qualities of the war at large. Keith Beattie, in The Scar that Binds, ties the cultural
understanding of the veteran with wild violence (exhibited in such movies as Taxi Driver,
1976, and Rambo: First Blood, 1982) because “[since] the violence at My Lai was so
excessive – so outside acceptable or accepted boundaries (even in war), and was therefore
determinably insane, [it] opened the way for a further demonization of the veteran as
mentally deranged and psychotic.”37 The soldier’s reputation in general, on some level,
was utterly despicable, since he or she was held responsible for all of the atrocities shown
photographically in the news. This was problematic for two reasons.
First, attacks levied did not discriminate. Regardless of whether an individual
actually participated in such crimes, he or she was often hastily blamed for the horrors of
war in general. Mike Cook, one of the veterans featured in the documentary Vietnam:
Homecoming (2007), remembers being harassed excessively upon returning back to the
U.S., despite being innocent of any serious war crimes: “When we drove out [of] the
gate, there were people yelling and screaming and throwing crap at the bus – I mean
literally crap at the bus. You could hear them yelling and screaming, and it wasn’t
‘welcome home,’ it was ‘S.O.B.,’ ‘babykillers.’ They told us when we debarked the bus,
36
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‘Don’t tell anyone where you came from, keep it to yourself. Go home and enjoy your
family.’”38 The protesters in this case attacked Cook as if he were the problematic aspects
of the war incarnated before their very eyes.
This hostility is something that at least a number of soldiers returning from
Vietnam experienced as justified. Others, however, experienced the hostility as
unjustified because they were condemned based on a misplaced assumption. The problem
with this hostility and symbolization was not just that some soldiers were
mischaracterized as violent when they were guilty of no wrongdoing. The problem is that
others, namely government and military officials responsible for giving the orders to the
soldiers to commit violent acts, were not held responsible in part because they avoided
becoming symbols in the public eye of wrong doing.
For three days in Detroit in 1971, the Vietnam Veterans Against the War held a
forum discussing precisely this unbalanced assignment of guilt. The New York Times
reported on the conference, calling attention to the general sentiments of the forum.
About 100 veterans showed up to confess that they had frequently witnessed what would
be called war atrocities: the torturing of soldiers, the killing of civilians, and the
mutilation of corpses.39 They, however, did not feel they should be held responsible for
such actions, because the military leadership designed the strategy that perpetuated these
kinds of activities. “We’re passing the buck and a certain number of the cents of that
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dollar belong to us,” said Kenneth Campbell, “but the people who make the policy should
be the first to burn.”40
Second, despite the fact that many activists rallied around images like those from
the My Lai massacre, most people within the anti-war movement were not specifically
against soldiers, and actual incidents in which soldiers shared Cook’s experience were
few. Some of the most fervent supporters for withdrawal from Vietnam were those who
had been there to witness the events first hand. However, that did not stop politicians,
activists, and news organizations from arguing their position with the soldier’s embattled
identity in mind. This is the second problematic aspect of photographic metonymy. The
officials who were actually responsible for perpetuating the continued hurtfulness of war,
those who gave the orders for destruction of villages and burning of hamlets, had a
scapegoat, and it was a scapegoat they could successfully defend.
On one level, it should not be surprising that many came to conflate the
inhumanity of war with the inhumanity of those who took part in it. In so many of the
iconic images from Vietnam, the American soldiers, or more often their South
Vietnamese allies, are implicated in the ethically-questionable actions or outright
atrocious acts. Since soldiers have always been associated with war, they became the
body politick upon which the ethicality of the war was argued. Nonetheless, the
relationship between photographs and the public that commends or disparages them is not
simple or consistent.
The nuances of the issue were not lost on U.S. Vice President and war proponent
Spiro Agnew. In April of 1971, Agnew made a speech at the 25th anniversary meeting of
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the Veterans Administration Volunteer Service. Selections from that speech were
reproduced in the Wisconsin State Journal. In that speech, Agnew said that war critics
were unjustly criticizing American soldiers. He not only said that this criticism was
unwarranted. Agnew also went as far as to say that these critics were “demoralizing
Americans on the front lines.”41 As if in deliberate reinforcement of the pro-war U.S.
government’s attempt to align itself against the anti-war movement via condemnation of
its supposed demonization of soldiers, the facing page reports Lt. Calley’s remarkably
light sentence for his part in the orchestration of the My Lai massacre – a point of heated
contention among war protestors.
This critique of the anti-war movement may have been hypocritical, but was
nonetheless quite effective. It was hypocritical because the U.S. government notoriously
neglected Vietnam War veterans after the war, so they defended the respectibility of the
soldier in rhetoric only.42 The critique was effective because it exposed the war protest in
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general as depending largely upon the image of the soldier as tragic and malignant, all the
while deflecting the critique away from the higher levels of command.
In an article for the November 17, 1969 issue of the New York Times, Nan
Robertson approached the very point of potency in Agnew’s claims: are wounded prowar veterans embittered by war critics? Robertson interviewed several veterans
recovering from their wounds at Walter Reed Army Medical Center.43 She characterized
them as proud and appreciative of the experience of war for maturing them. She also says
that these same men she interviewed largely felt no hostility towards the anti-war
movement. While none truly agreed with the anti-war movement’s message, most felt the
protesters were in some way honoring the soldiers’ sacrifice. One veteran, Staff Sergeant
Barry Baron, went as far as to say, “One reason we are fighting in Vietnam is so that
people can have long hair and beards and protest the war in Vietnam.”44 While there is
factual merit to instances of the veterans being harassed by the anti-war protestors, the
inflation of its prevalence into a binary of pro-war veterans/anti-veteran protestors is
nonetheless a distortion.
Interestingly, Robertson found that the thing about which these men felt most
insulted was a more officially-sanctioned rhetoric of war protest. Captain Corbin Cherry,
a chaplain in the war, was quoted as saying, “I’m with that lady that promises to sue the
moratorium if they read her son’s name again. Thousands and thousands of parents who
lost children don’t appreciate their names being read.”45 Apparently, these veterans did
not really find either particular polarization of ideology demoralizing or despicable, be it
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left wing protest or right wing
warmongering. They did,
however, find the practice of
utilizing the war dead to make
points about the ethicality of war
to be reprehensible.
The opinion of those
soldiers casts projects like LIFE
Magazine’s “One Week’s Dead”
in an entirely different light (Fig.
16). Although the editors of LIFE

Fig. 16 - One Weeks Dead, LIFE Magazine, June
03, 1969

made an attempt at impartiality
while claiming that they could “not speak for the dead,” the intention of showing the
portraits of hundreds of men who had died during the week of May 28-June 3, 1969, was
obviously aligned with a kind of humanistic argument for withdrawal from Vietnam. If
this was not evident in the pages of “One Week’s Dead,” it was easily divined from the
testimonial immediately following, which recounted the story of one such photograph as
symbolic of a “broader tragedy.”46 While the warmongering right appropriated the
disgraced veteran as a symbolic tool to define the war in its terms – as slowly derailed by
lack of support and eventually sabotaged by outright resistance, the protesting left
coopted the war dead to illustrate the scale of what they considered a tragedy. In either

46

Unattributed. “I see death coming up a hill,” TIME Magazine. June 27, 1969: 32.
38

case, the soldiers are usurped into a
struggle of ideology that
mischaracterizes them for political
gain.
While certainly the
photographs cannot be perceived as
solely responsible for the
subsuming the soldier into the body

Fig. 17 - Mike Kamber, 2007

politick in the aftermath of Vietnam, we cannot underestimate the role of Vietnam War
photographs in shaping images like Mike Kamber’s – photographs of soldiers threatening
the photographer with weapons (Fig. 17). No soldier wants to be the poster boy for the
brutality of war. Since the photographs from Vietnam, it is not hard to see a heightened
awareness of the power of damning images looming behind every aimed camera.

39

CHAPTER 3. INVENTING HEROES – IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN:
PHOTOGRAPHY’S TOTEMS AND TABOOS
After scanning the public photo archives of the US Department of Defense for
weeks, bloggers Norman Beierle and Hester Keijser discovered a silly trend:
Apart from the relative invisibility of the “enemy” combatants, the wounded and
the dead—after all, we are staring at the corporate face of the DoD—a number of
categories start to present themselves quite naturally. Among them, I found the set
of sunset soldiers probably one of the most puzzling ones. The army has a great
love for the silhouetted image.47
It should come as no surprise that these photographs, and ones of similar picturesque
quality, were the ones to wind up on the U.S. Department of Defense website. It would
be foolish to browse the public face of the military looking for anything less than a
romanticized picture of military life. All of these images are free to download at high
resolution, sowing advertisements for the military into the hard drive of whoever on the
Internet finds the images worth downloading.
Mishka Henner, in his explorations of the U.S. Department of Defense website,
finds other somewhat expected trends in the archives, exposing what he called a “sphere
of legitimate aesthetics” through which the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are being
presented: “Empire Sunsets (or what Beierle and Keijser called sunset soldiers),” “The
Friend (soldiers extending their hands to children),” and “The Healer (military doctors
treating sick civilians).”48 All of these images, even at first glance, render a pleasant and
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agreeable image of U.S. soldiers and of the counter insurgency conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Again, this is not a surprising discovery.
What should be a surprising discovery is the fact that these trends continue when
the search is shifted from the official propaganda of the U.S. Department of Defense to
the photojournalism of some of the major news organizations in the western world. The
archives of most major news organizations seem to follow these same trends of
romanticizing soldier life. This attitude is altogether desirable for those who would seek
public approval of the wars. But for those seeking a legitimate reportage of context to the
wars, a “legitimate sphere of aesthetics” is hardly convincing as an objective record.
What is the “legitimate sphere of aesthetics” in photojournalism with respect to the wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan, and what is its relationship to Vietnam War photography?
Throughout almost the entire wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there has been a
continuous desire on the part of the press and politicians to draw the comparisons among
the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam. There are certainly very obvious similarities.
Both the Vietnam War and the war in Afghanistan were counter insurgency conflicts in
pre-modernized countries. As I indicated in the introduction, both the Vietnam War and
the Iraq War share an arc of public opinion, particularly with respect to the introduction
of atrocity photographs. But with respect to photojournalism, the Vietnam War and the
recent wars in the Middle East are not very similar.
Much of the iconic photography that brought us tragic visions of the Vietnam War
was a result of the freedom granted to photojournalists to roam about Vietnam relatively
unencumbered. Eddie Adams characterized his experience in an interview reproduced in
Multimedia, Politics. 13 May 2011. Accessed 07 November 2011. http://www.davidcampbell.org/2011/05/13/vietnam-afghanistan-aesthetics-critical-photography/.
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the film “An Unlikely Weapon.” He said, “There was a hardcore group of people in
Vietnam. Especially photographers, who have probably seen more war than any soldier
or any general, and I don’t care who they are…We would go to all the battles.”49
Contrast those words for a moment against Rick Loomis’ words, a photographer
from the LA Times who shot the wars Iraq and Afghanistan. He said, at a World Press
Photo conference at USC Annenburg, “The front line, or as the Marines like to call it, the
tip of the spear, would change from day to day…One day, you think, okay here I am, it’s
the front, and it seems dangerous…and the next day you see boats going by on semitrucks, and you think this can’t be the tip of the spear, where am I now?...It’s totally
unknown to you, because once you’re in with a unit, you’re in and you don’t have a lot of
mobility.”50 What Loomis is describing here is the Pentagon policy of embedding
journalists with certain groups of soldiers for their protection, discussed above as
responsible for the so-called photojournalistic Stockholm syndrome.
The American soldier is indeed a well-established character in the history of
photography. But the problem with this character is that, after Vietnam, the soldier fell
from grace. It was not simply because soldiers during the Vietnam War were sometimes
pictured as a malignant presence, blindly muddling problems that were not their own. It
was also because, long since all the photo opportunities in Vietnam had ended, the
American soldier has been used to tell the unfavorable story of the Vietnam War. Since
the tragedy of the Vietnam War became associated with the face of the soldier, the image
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of the soldier was problematic for those who would seek to tell a favorable story, to
garner support for the efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
As I suggested with the example of the Sunset Soldiers, many of the photographs
from Iraq and Afghanistan overcompensate for the negative image established by the
Vietnam War; the Sunset Soldiers deliberately romanticize soldier life for fear of
inadvertently condemning it. In Vietnam, photojournalists were able to accurately reflect
declining public support of the war with images that were increasingly critical of war
practices. However, the legacy of these maligning images lingered. Policy that was
inspired by that legacy prevented embedded photojournalists in Iraq and Afghanistan
from being able to accurately reflect and cater to the waning public with regard to the
ethics of those wars.
When considering the course of the Vietnam War and the kinds of images that
were produced as anti-war sentiments grew, it is evident that the photographs shared a
symbiotic relationship with the movement. Critical images were created in a climate of
dissent, and then, by their existence in the cultural milieu, fomented further dissent.
When the “Support our Troops” cult of the soldier rhetoric emerged at the onset of first
the war in Afghanistan then the Iraq War, it reads as an attempt to prevent criticism of the
war via the actions of the soldiers – practices that were widely used in the Vietnam era. I
consider the term Sunset Soldiers, in this light, as a euphemism for the overwhelmingly
generic and congratulatory photographs that flood the newspapers from the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan.
Many of the photographs from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan share
iconographical similarities with the more everyday photographs from Vietnam. One
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theme, for example, from all three wars was the
wounded soldier – the soldier as victim. This
theme was explored by Burrows in One Ride with
Yankee Papa 13, as discussed in the previous
section. The idea of these photographs is that we
relate to the war through an empathetic reaction to
the transgressed subject. When we look into the
faces of the troubled soldiers, we experience their
emotion mirrored onto us.
This is why most of the iconic images from
the Vietnam War were considered anti-war
photographs. The photographs’ content were

Fig. 18 - Henri Huet, LIFE
Magazine, 1966

organized in such a way that they encouraged the viewer to relate to characters who were
supposed to be our enemies. That is the case with Ut’s photograph of Kim Phuc. When
soldiers were pictured, they were cold and amoral. The photographs that often did depict
the soldier were tragedies, like One Ride with Yankee Papa 13, and cultivated
hopelessness, which revealed an anti-war stance. Henri Huet’s photograph of the two
soldiers with head bandages during a battle in the Central Highlands in January of 1966 is
another such photo (Fig. 18). The wounded soldiers reach out like zombies in abjection
and despair.
Perhaps part of the reason why photographs of wounded soldiers in Vietnam
appear to express a sense of hopelessness and meaninglessness is because there was no
real initial trauma to justify their presence in Vietnam. This is, of course, not the case
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with the war in Afghanistan. Marvin and Deborah Kalb wrote that presidents before Bush
II were reluctant to enter into a so-called “boots on the ground” conflict because, since
Vietnam, they feared the emptiness of morale that followed when hardship was endured
without legitimate motivation. But, like Dick Cheney said, everything changed after 9/11.
President Bush took 9/11 as the ultimate justification to enter a foreign war. “You’ve got
to take 9/11 and smack it down right in the middle of it, it was the
dominant…development that overwhelmed everything.”51 Until 9/11, American war
policy had been especially tentative. But afterward, Marvin and Deborah Kalb suggested
that the Bush administration felt they could “no longer shilly-shally through a crisis. It
could no longer lose another war. It could no longer be humiliated. It had to be tough, and
if challenged, it had to meet the challenge and emerge triumphant for the world to see.” 52
As the Kalbs’ language implies, in order to try and escape the Vietnam War’s
dreadful historical wake, the Bush administration employed a strategy and rhetoric of
inflated bravado. This is the initial source of what I have called the cult of the soldier, or
what Jeff Stein termed the “Hero Syndrome.” He noticed that the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan, like Vietnam, are counter-insurgency conflicts, and are conducted as a
systematic liquidation of enemy combatants, necessarily outside the eyes of the public.
The killing is just too vicious. Retired U.S. Army Major John Nagle has remarked that
the U.S.-run Kill/Capture missions that dominate the offensive in the Middle East is
“almost an industrial-scale counter-terrorism killing machine.”53 Jeff Stein, after relating
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Kill/Capture to the Phoenix program during Vietnam, reminded the reader that
“counterinsurgency doesn’t lend itself to Homeric heroes…victories are short, dirty,
ambiguous, morally questionable, and often inconsequential. From the muck of the war
on terror, heroes have to be invented.”54 Photography can be used to “invent heroes” just
as it “symbolized evil” in Vietnam.
It is important at this point to distinguish between the Iraq War and the
Afghanistan War. The war in Afghanistan was initially meant to oust the Taliban
government that implicitly supported terrorism by refusing to hand over Al Qaeda leaders.
After the Taliban was removed from sovereignty, the war in Afghanistan became a
counter-insurgency operation, preventing a Taliban coup against the Karzai
administration, while searching out Taliban and Al Qaeda guerillas and bases in the
countryside. The war in Iraq was meant to liberate the Iraqi people from Saddam
Hussein’s dictatorship, while locating and destroying his alleged weapons of mass
destruction. However, the war in Afghanistan has been dramatically more popular than
the war in Iraq. Gallup poles show that until recently the public felt that the U.S. was
justified in its continued presence in Afghanistan. 55 In Iraq, on the other hand, public
opinion dropped dramatically as early as 2005, at a rate faster than the decline of public
support for Vietnam.56
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Where the Iraq War was aimed
at a clearly definable photographable
menace (Hussein), the war in
Afghanistan had more in common with
the war in Vietnam in that the enemy
was diffuse. With the Vietnam War and
the war in Afghanistan, the U.S. was
battling abstractions – with the Vietnam

Fig. 19 - Tyler Hicks, The New York Times,
2001

War, the insidious disease of Soviet Communism in the jungles of Southeast Asia, and
with the war in Afghanistan, the threat of terror in the foothills of the Middle East.
However, unlike both the Iraq War and the Vietnam War, the war in Afghanistan had an
initial cause to underscore the necessity of war: 9/11. It could be suggested that Osama
bin Laden was the target, but bin Laden was not as substantial a figure as Hussein, simply
because after 9/11 with a few minor (video) exceptions, he seemed to disappear into the
caves, and until 2011 when he was killed, he was almost forgotten while the war waged
on.
3.1 Afghanistan
Arguably the most iconic photograph to emerge out of the immediate post-9/11
stage of the war in Afghanistan was Tyler Hicks’ photograph of the Taliban execution
(Fig. 19). The exceptional thing about Tyler Hicks’ photographs of the U.S. and Northern
Alliance effort to oust the Taliban from their strongholds in Afghanistan in 2001 was that
Hicks sensed the impending war after 9/11 and made it into Afghanistan before the

47

borders were closed.57 That means he was able to enter the country without being subject
to an embed, and before his photographs were required to be inspected by unit
commanders.
Hicks’ photograph captures vengeance in the moment of execution. It could be
compared to Eddie Adams photograph of Gen. Loan. However, where Loan appeared to
kill with a cold indifference, the Northern Alliance fighters killed with a heated, almost
fetishized desire for the enemy’s blood. These elements of fetish and desire are pictured
in the energy of the executioners who almost hungrily fire guns into the lone Taliban
soldier. These sentiments are reified and accentuated by the Taliban resistor’s naked legs.
The scene may be of an execution by firing squad, but it reads like a gang rape, right
down to the bloodied pants hanging around his ankles.
Hicks’ photo series, the images from which culminated in depicting the execution
of the Taliban soldier, won a World Press Photo award in 2001, just like Adams’
photograph did in 1969. However, despite the poignancy of both photographs, Hicks’
photograph eerily matched the aggravated pro-war sentiments because of its proximity to
9/11 and the heightened rage of national discourse in 9/11’s wake. Where Adams’
photograph cultivated disdain for war and matched the anti-war rhetoric, Hicks’
photograph matched what Jasbir K. Puar called the “eager proliferation of homophobicrascist images” in America after 9/11, some of which appeared in New York only days
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after the attacks “depicting a turbaned
caricature of Osama bin Laden being
anally penetrated by the Empire State
Building.”58
The presence of a first cause, a
first impetus in the form of an event
(9/11) that justifies reactionary

Fig. 20 - Mike Yoder, Journal World, 2001

violence and even the pain of
sacrifice, is what distinguishes not
only this photograph from its
historical counterparts from the
Vietnam War, but many other more
standard photographs as well. The
events of 9/11 interrupted the

Fig. 21 - Tim Hetherington, Sleeping Soldier
Doc Kelso, 2007

historical understanding of
photographs with a renewed, reversed context just as photographs from the Vietnam War
subverted the image of the soldier into a renewed, reversed context.
Despite the few dead bodies pictured in photographs from 9/11, there were many
photographs of live bodies taken that exemplify traumatic victimhood. This is the case
with the photographs of men and women watching the events of 9/11 unfold, teary-eyed
and glued to the nearest television. They reaffirm and justify the emotional response to
the tragedy by appearing to objectify the condition of mourning. They show the viewer of
58

Jasbir K. Puar. Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times. (Durham:
Duke University Press, 2007): 37.
49

the photograph to himself or herself through the face of the other, exemplifying the
uniting, grief-affirming similarities.
The photograph acts as a mirror. It
says, yes, you and I are the victims of
9/11.
As compared to the images of
shocked 9/11 mourners (Fig. 20), it is
clear that the victimizing mirror format
in general was not an isolated
iconographical or compositional theme

Fig. 22 - Cover of the April 02, 2006 issue of
the Los Angeles Times featuring a photograph
by Rick Loomis

in photographs of the war in
Afghanistan after the embedding policy
went into effect. While images at once
reaffirmed the same bravado that the Bush
administration harnessed from the backlash
of 9/11, they also confirmed that the
wounds of 9/11 were still fresh. In order to
Fig. 23 - James Nachtwey, TIME
Magazine, 2011

justify war, it must both appear winnable
and just. Bush’s “dead or alive” mantra,

like Toby Kieth’s punch line, “we’ll put a boot in your ass, it’s the American way,”
reinforce the sentiment of winability, while the slogan that christens 9/11 remembrance
celebrations, “never forget,” keeps the wounds open. While the specter of Vietnam
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lingers in images as an overcompensation attempting to avoid the prospect of losing, 9/11
haunts them with a kind of ceaseless victimization of these so-called heroes.
Most demurely perhaps, this is seen in Tim Hetherington’s Sleeping Soldiers
(2007-8) series from his trip into the Korengal Valley of Afghanistan, through which he
portrays the American soldier not as a valiant and patriotic champion, but as a fragile
child enduring grave hardship – a victim of some unknown nightmare (Fig. 21).
Nonetheless, unlike Burrow’s photographs
of Farley, these photographs picture the
soldier as unassumingly heroic in that they
are victims of necessity, avenging 9/11 in
spite of the psychological pain they incur
as a result. While they depict victimhood,
this victimhood is not without hope. These

Fig. 24 - Louie Palu, The Toronto Star,
2011

images are tinged with an optimistic
heroism.
In a much more physical way, the
victims of enemy violence are pictured in
Rick Loomis’ series called Lifeline (2006),
which he produced for the Los Angeles
Times (Fig. 22). The images are graphic;

Fig. 25 - Tyler Hicks, The New York
Times, 2011

most are bloody. These soldiers were
seriously wounded in Afghanistan, and the

only thing that seems to make them tolerable to the viewer is the vitality left in their eyes,
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as if the American spirit can never die. In the end, these are pictures of Americans who
are, yes, wounded, but more importantly are overcoming the hardships of the war with
state of the art medical technology.
The consistency and monotony of these kinds of soldier images is ostensible.
Michael Shaw, of BagNewsNotes.com, points out how three of the industry’s best
photographers were sent by three of the world’s largest news organizations to get
photographs that give context to the war in Afghanistan. What was the result? Each
organization published nearly the same photograph, from the three different
photographers within two weeks (Fig. 23 - 25). “Not to
take anything away from the thoroughly accomplished
James Nachtwey, Louie Palu, and Tyler Hicks, but what
does it tell us that TIME, The Toronto Star, and The
New York Times all offered us powerful, dramatic, and
overlapping photo-stories of U.S. medevac teams saving
U.S and Afghan lives via helicopter ‘missions of
mercy.’”59 These images have historical matches. Photo
archives from the war in Vietnam are peppered with
helicopter rescues as well as soldiers receiving medical
treatment. Beyond that similarity, there are differences.
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Compare Tyler Hicks’
photograph to one of Larry Burrows’
from One Ride with Yankee Papa 13,
which ran on the cover of LIFE (Fig.
26). The soldier in Hicks’ photograph
confidently reassures the viewer that
everything is a-okay even though
someone was hurt. On the other hand,

Fig. 27 - David Guttenfelder, Associated
Press, 2009

Burrows photographed Farley in a moment of weakness, exhibiting fear and insecurity.
So in one instance, the Hicks photograph is an image of victimization because one of the
characters appears to be badly wounded. But more importantly, front and center is his
rescuer, acting heroically in the time of tragedy. If there was a frame when Burrows
caught Farley in a moment of confidence, it didn’t make it to print. Likewise, if Hicks
photographed this unnamed soldier in a moment of fear, it did not make the cut. This is a
complete ideological reversal.
A number of other photographs share this encouraging, a-okay mentality without
being so boisterously heroic. One of the most celebrated photographs from the war in
Afghanistan was taken by David Guttenfelder in the Korengal Valley. Of the photograph,
David Dunlap writes on The New York Times photography blog that while looking over
the top searches on The New York Times website for the week of May 18, 2009,
“something strange popped up in the No. 10 position: pink boxers.”60 This photograph,
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which graced the cover of The New York Times’ printed edition, features Specialist
Zachary Boyd standing alongside two other soldiers (Fig. 27). All three soldiers are
aiming their rifles into the mountainous landscape from behind a barricade, but only two
of the soldiers are fully dressed. Boyd is pictured wearing only a red t-shirt, his helmet, a
backpack, and a pair of pink “I Love NY” boxer shorts.
This image is significant beyond its levity. It pictures the soldiers living very
normal lives even though they are at war. Despite being at one of the most dangerous
military bases in Afghanistan, Boyd still finds himself able to lounge around in his
underwear. This ability to lounge is reassuring because although the soldiers are being
fired upon, they still on some level are pictured enjoying the comforts of home. Not to
mention the fact that the print of
his underwear reminds the viewer
for the reason why Boyd must
wake up early to fire his gun in
Afghanistan: 9/11.
This casual representation
of the goings on in the Korengal

Fig. 28 - Erik de Castor, Reuters, 2011

Valley is also a bit misleading
considering the reputation of the base. The Korengal Valley is relatively isolated from the
other military bases in Afghanistan, and it sits between two mountainous ridges occupied
by the Taliban insurgents. The base, Restrepo, is set in the very center of this valley,

30 November 2011. http://lens.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/21/behind-the-scenes-man-inthe-pink-boxers/
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along an old mujahedeen trail.61 Sebastian Junger wrote that the valley “is widely
considered to be the most dangerous valley in northeastern Afghanistan” and that “men
have been shot while asleep in their barracks tents.”62 Boyd clearly was able to avoid this
danger despite his level of comfort. Regardless, the tone of the photograph suggests the
ease and comfort of a Sunday on the couch rather than a firefight in the most dangerous
valley in Afghanistan.
John Lucaites sees a similar sentiment in the often-published photographs of
soldiers practicing good hygiene. Erik de Castro’s photograph features a soldier next to a
large and powerful automatic weapon brushing his teeth (Fig. 28). Lucaites writes that
“such soldiers might be stationed
far from home and under lessthan-normal circumstances, their
lives may be at risk and they
might even be called upon to kill
or die in the name of God and
country, but for all of that the
basic habits of a civilized people

Fig. 29 - Sayed Salahuddin, Reuters, 2001

abide…they feign to suggest that
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one can fight a war and still maintain clean
hands.”63 Again, beyond levity, this photograph
reminds us that American levels of comfort still
remain in the Taliban-infested jungle. When
seen against Larry Burrows’ photograph of
wounded soldiers lying in muck, the ideological

Fig. 30 - Unattributed, Department
of Defense, 2005

orientation of the photographs are apparent. The
sense of grimy hardship has been sterilized from
most depictions of the war in Afghanistan.
The civilian casualties and maimings
resulting from so-called precision bombing and
Kill/Capture missions are consistently absent

Fig. 31 - Noor Kahn, Associated
Press, 2005

from photographic accounts of the wars despite
Hamid Karzai’s almost yearly pleas to the U.S. to curtail “collateral” damage.64 Reuter’s
has published a few of these photographs online over the course of the war; however,
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they have never been published in print by mainstream western news organizations (Fig.
29). The harm done by these well-meaning warriors from the portraits is nearly invisible,
unclear. Marc Harold, an economics professor at the University of New Hampshire, has
written extensively on the subject. In a 2006 paper about Afghani civilian casualties, he
cited two images, one depicting a soldier giving a young Afghan boy a tee-shirt (Fig. 30),
and another of a younger boy on life support for the wounds he sustained during a U.S.
precision bombing on his village, Hajiyan (Fig. 31). He wrote: “Both pictures are ‘true’
and neither one alone represents reality. Both illustrate two images of modern war: the
war to win hearts and minds and the war to kill the enemy. They are inseparable.”65
Perhaps the most ubiquitous photographs from the war in Vietnam depicted the
direct effects and collateral damage from the “war to kill the enemy:” Eddie Adams’
photograph of the assassination of the Vietcong prisoner, Nick Ut’s photograph of the
naked, napalm-burned Kim Phuc, Ronald Haeberle’s photograph of the bodies in the
street at My Lai. In light of these photographs it is almost obvious why only photographs
of “the war to win the hearts and minds” currently make it to publication. Each one of the
previously mentioned photographs from the war in Vietnam was used for propaganda by
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the anti-war movement, most
notably the My Lai photograph,
which became the famous And
Babies poster by the hands of the
Art Workers’ Coalition.
Even though Osama bin
Laden’s killing maintained this

Fig. 32 - Pete Souza, White House, 2011

precedent of censorship, it
generated arguably the most iconic image from the war in Afghanistan. That image is
Pete Souza’s photograph of President Barack Obama with his top advisors in the
Situation Room during the raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound (Fig. 32). In ways, it is
allegorical of the censorship: the American people all stared at their televisions and
computer screens waiting for the images, and all they got was a reflection of themselves,
represented in Souza’s photograph by their elected officials, staring. The composition is
weighted heavily on the right, but is balanced so evenly on the left by the substantial
presence of what is seen by the officials, but unseen by us. Even if a closer look is taken,
perhaps to search for a reflection, a clue about what exactly is outside the frame, all that
is found are remnants of censorship in the form of chunky pixels. The irony is that
pixilation is exactly what happens when you get too close to a digital image: it breaks
down into the same kind of abstraction.
Recall Michelangelo Antonioni’s 1966 feature Blow-Up in which the
photographer, Thomas, investigates his suspicions surrounding some seemingly
uneventful photographs of a man and woman in a park, only to discover a corpse in the
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bushes. The closer he gets to the image, the more information it reveals to him, and yet
the more it degrades into abstraction. His friend Patricia remarks that the blown up body
looks like a splatter painting – the implication being that Thomas is perhaps only
discovering a kind of subjective Rorschach-ian interpretation; he is only seeing his own
suspicion, anxiety, and victimization gestalted from the non-descript spots.
The same is true of the Souza image, and yet no enlargement is needed. Too close
just comes too soon. The viewer’s murder investigation comes to a startling halt when all
the clues are found blurred, cropped, and blanked off of the screens. There is no corpse in
the bushes. The only details that are found reaffirm that no relevant information is
available. It is almost startling how quickly this image undergoes a fundamental shift
upon viewing. The image, once considered as a window into the Situation Room,
becomes a mirror. Where one expects to find information, there is only reflection,
refraction.
Let’s not forget that the Souza image has since been steeped in a bit of
controversy with regard to what is excluded from the frame. The President and his top
advisors in this scene are privy to an image that we will likely never see. The primary
argument for censorship of the bin Laden death photos and the other photos of the raid on
the Abbottabad compound was that we would be protected from the hardship those who
saw the photos and the body itself endured. It was an argument for discretion. The White
House described the photos as graphically “gruesome,” and was concerned that the
images would be “inflammatory” if released.66 This argument was presented as a kind of
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anti-ideology, as if to say, “We are preventing these photos from reaching the public
because we are not ideological.” The photographs were painted, in this sense, as tools of
ideology. The decision to release the photos, by this mindset, would be a decision to
reinforce anti-Arab sentiment, hidden in the guise of merely providing proof of the
occurrence of an event.
President Obama’s decision to lift the 18-year ban on photographs of American
coffins returning from war in February of 2009 was deemed disrespectful to grieving
families and was resurrected in light of the bin Laden censorship controversy. Not
surprisingly, the objection to the sight of American coffins often came from the same
direction as those who would release the bin Laden photo. Numerous bloggers, from John
Miller of National Review to Townhall.com’s Katie Pavich, accused President Obama of
being soft on terror. Pavich quipped, “Obama won’t release a single photo of a dead
Osama bin Laden in order to avoid ‘offending’ the Muslim world, but openly supports
the idea of photos being taken of our dead troops, killed by our enemies under bin
Laden.”67 This seems to be the ideological shifting point.
CNN’s Anderson Cooper would have it the other way around. On the very night
that Americans were told of Osama bin Laden’s death by the hands of U.S. Navy SEALS,
Cooper broadcast from Ground Zero. In his closing monologue, his message, in
retrospect, has a very interesting sentiment: remember the victims and soon forget Osama
bin Laden’s name. He said, while accompanied, perhaps appropriately, by the ceaseless
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jackhammers of the reconstruction efforts hammering alongside his composed words,
“We are a country that does not drag the bodies of our enemies through the streets. We do
not behead them for the entertainment of others. We do not mutilate their corpses. I think
of his body sinking into the sea, disappearing into the dark depths of the ocean. This man
who terrorized so many for so long has simply disappeared…there will be no grave
marker for him.”68 Following this, he showed slides of the American victims of the
World Trade Center attacks, which easily recall LIFE Magazine’s “One Week’s Dead.”
It sure is nice to know that American's no longer drag the bodies of our enemies
through the streets. After all, they once did. In fact, it is likely because of the Haeberle’s
images of the massacre at My Lai, of the bodies of the woman and children and babies of
our enemies lying in the streets and others like it, that the Vietnam War has become,
perhaps even for the most boisterous warmongers, a point of shame in American history.
There is no comparison to be made between the innocent families slaughtered in My Lai
and the assassination of a mass murderer, who, given the chance, would likely kill again.
However, this policy of withholding images is not exclusive to the circumstances of bin
Laden’s demise. There is a pattern of American policy on such matters that demands the
question: “What would we see if we saw these images?” The question hangs over the
image of the Situation Room like a dark cloud.
As a mirror, the Situation Room image reveals to us a vision of ourselves. We see
ourselves searching for truth, but also victimized by the idea of the content of that truth.
With the soldier portraits and other depictions of the victimization of Americans and their
68
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“allies,” we look for the truth of the nature of the war, and see only the effects of
subjective violence. The effects of violence appeal to our empathy, causing us to see
ourselves wounded by the very same violence. It is in this way that the very depiction of
the effects of subjective violence seems, on a basic level, a condemnation of the agent of
that violence. This process is the refracting nature of victimization in photographs.
Censorship of images then, by reciprocal logic, would prevent hypothetical empathy for
the transgressed subject resulting from the experience of the enemy in the photographmirror as the wounded self.
This seems to also confer a paradoxical exemption on the enemy. The censorship
of the images prevented empathy, but also inevitably maintained that the members of the
American viewing public were victims of a specifically-invisible enemy. First on 9/11,
Americans were victims of the impossible event occurring, as Jacques Derrida famously
characterized it: an event that is past once it was realized as possible.69 The tragedy of
9/11 is partly that the past-ness of it can never be changed, and every photograph
reaffirmed to us that it would never be part of a present that could be changed or affected.
We were victims of this perpetual realization through the millions of photographs that
confronted us following the event of 9/11.
Bin Laden could not disappear like Cooper suggested because he never appeared.
The perpetrator of 9/11 was not a bold and visible threat, but an invisible man, hiding in
the mountains somewhere in the Middle East. As we plumb the Souza image like BlowUp’s Thomas does to his park images, we are still on this very same hunt for physical
form of the agent of terror. By keeping the death images hidden, the end of this search
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then also remains invisible, impossible. As we can see in the Souza image, we are still the
victims. The event that might end the
perpetuation of this ideology of inevitable
victimization and terror remains impossible.

3.2 Iraq

The mission in Iraq was termed

Fig. 33 - Damir Sagolj, Reuters, 2003

“Operation Iraqi Freedom.” This name alone suggested that the marketable angle for the
war was liberation – the Iraqi people were suffering under a despotic ruler it was our
responsibility to end their suffering. When the combat in Iraq officially began on March
19, 2003, without NATO sanctions, President Bush made it clear that Hussein was the
primary target of the campaign in Iraq. In a televised address a few hours after the first
barrage of missiles were unleashed, Bush said that “coalition forces have begun striking
selected targets of military importance to undermine Saddam Hussein’s ability to wage
war,” and accused Hussein of placing his “Iraqi troops and equipment in civilian areas,
attempting to use innocent men, women, and children as shields for his own military.”70
The first reinforcement of President Bush’s official narrative came
photographically very shortly after the invasion of Iraq and the first real battle of the war:
the Battle of Nasiriyah. On March 29, 2003, after crossing the Rumaila oil fields earlier
in the week, and then overtaking Nasiriyah, the 1st Marine Division faced the final enemy
70
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resistors. According to MSNBC, “a crossfire on the front lines ripped apart an Iraqi family
after local soldiers appeared to force civilians toward Marine positions.”71 In the
aftermath, Damir Sagolj photographed U.S. Navy Hospital Corpsman HM1 Robert
Barnett cradling a small Iraqi child with
blood on her sleeve (Fig. 33). The
photograph was nominated for a Pulitzer
Prize in 2004, and is one of the more lasting
examples of the early Iraq War’s invented
heroes and “patriotic fables.”72
When Baghdad was taken over by

Fig. 34 - Goran Tomasevic, Reuters,
2003

U.S. troops less than a month later, Hussein

fell as well. Not the actual, living, breathing man, Saddam Hussein – that would come
later – but instead the totemic Hussein, in the form of a gigantic public effigy. The statue,
which stood nearly 40 feet tall, was erected in Firdos Square in 2002 in honor of
Hussein’s 65th birthday. It was pulled down by U.S. tanks on April 9, 2003, producing
arguably the first iconic images from the Iraq War. I say images because there is not
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really one definitive image that has stood out among the
thousands taken from the event (Fig. 34). So many
images exist because, during the Iraq War, Firdos
Square was the location of the Palestine Hotel, which
housed the majority of international press members.
The spectacle was broadcast around the world.
The circumstances of the photographed event
are symbolic of the official explanation of the war. On a
Wednesday morning after traveling by tank to Firdos
Square, Marines discovered several Iraqis attempting to

Fig. 35 - Cover of the
November 10, 2004 issue of
the New York Post featuring
photograph by Luis Sinco

topple the statue with a rope,
identified with their struggle to bring
it down, and lent them a hand with a
military crane. This is how Operation
Iraqi Freedom was billed – the U.S.
was successfully aiding the Iraqi

Fig. 36 – Luis Sinco, Associated Press, 2004

people in a struggle of their own.
Unlike the early iconic photographs from Vietnam, rather than
countering the official narrative and naïve assumptions about war,
this early iconic photograph from the Iraq War reestablished those
fundamental mischaracterizations.
Another great example of a photograph that was of use in
“inventing heroes” was Luis Sinco’s photograph of Marine Lance
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Fig. 37 - Ed
Clark, Getty
Images, 1949

Corporal James Blake Miller smoking a cigarette during the Second Battle of Fallujah
(Fig. 35). This photograph is better known as the “Marlboro Marine,” and was featured
on the cover of the New York Post on November 10, 2004 (Fig. 36), among numerous
other publications, and was nominated for the Pulitzer Prize in 2005. The New York Post
headline read “Marlboro Men Kick Butt in Fallujah.” Compared it to Henri Huet’s
photograph of zombie-like American soldiers in the Central Highlands on the February
1966 cover of LIFE Magazine, which was captioned a sobering “The War Goes On.”
Sinco’s photograph and its sentiments share more with shots of John Wayne during the
production of Sands of Iwo Jima (Fig. 37) than it does with Huet’s photograph of the
dirty, battle-deranged soldiers fighting the early stages of the Vietnam War. In 2005,
confidence fully broke in the war in Iraq. Yet, rather than effectively symbolizing the
“dire, calamitous arc” of the war to
come the way photographs like Huet’s
and Burrow’s would before 1968,
Sinco’s photograph made LCpl Miller
“a celebrity poster boy for the U.S.
effort in Fallujah and a hero in his
hometown.”73
The other poster boy of the

Fig. 38 - Michael Yon, U.S. Army via
Associated Press, 2005

early-mid war period was Major Mark Bieger, who, like Barnett in the first few days of
the invasion, was caught in the act of cradling a young Iraqi girl who was wounded by an
insurgent’s car bomb (Fig. 38). In this situation, the photographer had specifically
73

Patrick Gallahue. “Marlboro Marine Fires Up Troop Morale.” The New York Post. 14
November 2004. Online. http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1279813/posts
66

intended to utilize the photograph to create empathy for the troops. Like many of these
photographs, the meaning attributed to them is largely determined by the context into
which they are framed. When war-critics like Michael Moore and Shock Magazine used
the photograph in an attempt to paint a negative picture of the war (Fig. 39), Michael Yon,
the photographer who shot the image, launched a massive campaign to have the
photographs removed. In the case of Michael Moore, who simply posted the photograph
on his website, Yon threatened a lawsuit for copyright violation.
With Shock Magazine, the situation was a little more complicated. The caption on
the cover of Shock drew on an all-too sensitive comparison: “ON THE FRONT – WAR
IS STILL HELL! Jarring proof that Iraq is the new Vietnam (their emphasis).”74 Yon
alleged that Shock used the photograph without permission, but his citation of this
infringement was not only to protect his legal and monetary rights as a photographer.
Yon used his legitimate legal rights to enforce what he considered to be an equally
legitimate claim to the connotation and aesthetics of the image. In an interview with
Media Orchard, Yon was asked how much his suit actually had to do with his desire to
strictly enforce his copyright. He replied that his challenge to Shock’s use
is evenly divided between three points of contention: first, the fact of the
infringement is a clear cut case of using my property without my permission;
second, (a) the manner in which the image was used to frame an article that
denigrates our military, (the polar opposite message from what I contend is
conveyed by the image) (b) the use of the image in a publication that I think is
lame, hackneyed, and beneath contempt and (c) the timing of the launch to
coincide with Memorial Day; and, third, the bad faith HFM demonstrated
throughout our negotiations.75

74

Hachette Filipacchi. Shock Magazine. May 2006: cover.
“Media Orchard Interviews Michael Yon.” Media Orchard. Online. 19 June 2006.
Accessed 19 March 2012. http://www.ideagrove.com/blog/2006/06/media-orchardinterviews-michael-yon.html.
75

67

The interesting questions here are these: What
determines connotation, or more politically, the
ideological direction of an image? Content or
intent? Reader or author? Yon can certainly make
a claim to the denotation, but can he speak for
what “is conveyed by the image?”
Yon’s background is especially relevant to
the Shock’s “hackneyed” headline comparing the
Iraq War to the Vietnam War. Yon served in the

Fig. 39 - Cover of the May 2006
issue of Shock Magazine
featuring photograph by Michael
Yon

Vietnam War as one of the famed “Green
Beret.” The Green Beret themselves were
one of the few attempts by the military to
mythologize the Vietnam War into a
“patriotic fable” of its own.76 Yon’s book,
Moment of Truth In Iraq, uses his
photograph of Bieger to communicate

Fig. 40 - Unattributed, 2003

exactly the opposite message that Shock
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tried to deliver with the photograph. Of the book, the publisher, Richard Vigilante Books,
wrote (in praise) “Reading this book is like watching the movie Apocalypse Now, but in
an alternate universe in which the opposite always happens. Every time our soldiers get
into an incredibly tense situation…our guys pull it off!”77
Saddam Hussein was discovered hiding in an underground lair on December 13,
2003. In this situation, the soldiers who located him did in fact “pull it off.” The
photograph from this event, which emerged in August of 2004, pictured Saddam as a
kind of hunting trophy (Fig. 40), lending
visual support to Major General Ray
Odierno’s quote from the day: “He was
caught like a rat.”78 In the photograph,
Samir Al-Jassim, an Iraqi-turnedAmerican who fled Saddam’s regime
shortly after the Persian Gulf War, proudly,

Fig. 41 - Unattributed, Department of
Defense, 2003

yet anonymously, reported to the River
Front Times that he had “punched Saddam
in the face.”79
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After he was brought in, Saddam was treated to a kind of extreme exposure. The
image that accompanied the news of his identification and incarceration was the still from
his dental exam, the video of which was shot by an anonymous military photographer
(Fig. 41). W.J.T. Mitchell found this image to be a
resounding victory for Iraq War propagandists for two
primary reasons:
First, it defused any hint of cruelty by staging
Saddam’s captors as looking after his health,
perhaps determining whether he had
developed any cavities or abscesses during his
underground existence, or preventing him
from committing suicide with a cyanide
capsule embedded in one of his teeth. Second,
it suggested that the U.S. military had finally
achieved the elusive objective of total victory,
since now it had penetrated “inside the head”
of the head of state. Any remaining secrets
would now come to light, and it did not take
long, in fact, for the image to be reproduced
with a new caption: “the search for weapons

Fig. 42 - Cover of the May
2006 issue of The Sun
featuring an anonymous
leaked photograph

of mass destruction continues.”80
This image of the penetration of the head of state, coupled with Bush’s notorious
“Mission Accomplished” photo-op, cast the Iraq War in a very pointed light. Where it is
commonly believed that the Vietnam War was an unwinnable quagmire with no clear
objectives, the Iraq War, as imagined by these photographs, was not only a war with a
visible (penetrable) objective, it was a war that’s objective was completed.
Later, in 2006, a soldier leaked photographs to Rupert Murdoch’s tabloid The Sun.
They published the most humiliating photograph on the front page (Fig. 42), as did the
80
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The New York Post, which featured Saddam doing laundry in his underwear. The Sun
claimed that the photographs needed to be seen because they thought seeing Saddam,
“once the world’s most feared despot with the blood of innocent thousands on his
murderous hands, now…reduced to shuffling around his prison compound in his
underpants and washing his OWN dirty socks in a simple bowl (their emphasis).”81
Immediately after their printing, the U.S. military vowed to aggressively investigate the
lead of the photographs because they “appeared to breach Geneva Convention rules on
the humane treatment of prisoners of war.”82
Despite the obligatory objection to the content of the image published by The Sun,
the official image of Saddam released to the press achieved the same objective –
humanizing and therefore demythologizing the former sovereign by invasively depicting
his physicality. This similarity testifies not to the newsworthiness of the leaked photo,
because frankly Saddam’s dental exam was not particularly newsworthy. The similarity
in the objectives of these images instead should reflect on the tabloid-quality of Saddam’s
presentation in the Western media once captured.
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Of course, the war had taken a very ugly turn with regard to other prisoners of
war in May of 2004 with the leak of the Abu Ghraib archive. Until that point, the
enormously encouraging photographic narrative seemed entirely justified even though
only the paper objectives had been achieved – the Iraqi people were still caught in a
bloody civil war, and no weapons of mass destruction had been found.
In the case of the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse photos, reality would provide its
own sinister detournement of the invented hero photographs that were popular early in
the war. This unintended detournement is the case with the notorious photograph,
reffered to as “the photograph with the smile (Fig. 43).” This photograph is one of the
now infamous photographs taken by the 372nd MP Brigade serving at Abu Ghraib prison,
west of Baghdad, in the fall of 2003. The photograph was taken by Chuck Graner of
Sabrina Harman posing with a
smile and a thumbs-up next to the
body of a recently murdered
prisoner, Manadel al-Jamadi. This
image, in a lot of ways, speaks
against soldiers more effectively
than equivalent images from
Vietnam. The protagonist in this
photo, Harman, is reacting to the

Fig. 43 - Charles Graner, 2004

corpse of al-Jamadi with delight
rather than nonchalance.
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As damage control, Bush administration disavowed Harman and the others,
suggesting that she was one of a few bad apples that did not otherwise ruin the whole
bunch. This reaction came almost immediately after the release of the photos. During the
60 Minutes segment, which broke the news on May 06, 2004, Dan Rather interviewed
General Mark Kimmet. During the interview, he made it a point not only to disavow the
acts, but those responsible: “This is reprehensible. But this is not representative of the
150,000 soldiers that are over here [...] I’d say the same thing to the American people ...
Don’t judge your Army based on the actions of a few...”83
When Lynndie England, the soldier who would bear a large amount of the legal
punishment for Abu Ghraib, was
photographed for her trial, instead of
presenting her alongside her defense team like
most photographs of defendants, she was
shown closely cropped by their black suited
shoulders – compositionally isolated (Fig. 44).
This photograph appeared on the front page of
the May 03, 2005 issue of the New York
Times with the caption “Guilty Plea in Abu

Ghraib Abuse.” A telling comparison is

Fig. 44 - Cover of the May 03, 2005
issue of the New York Times featuring
photograph by Paul Buck

between the photograph of England as an

isolated bad apple, and the photograph of Lt. Calley (the only man sentenced for
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wrongdoing at My Lai) that appeared in the April 04, 1971 issue of the Wisconsin State
Journal. In the face of a “No More War” poster Calley smiles at the news of his pardon,
because the Nixon administration refused to cast him aside.
During the time between Calley and England, an odd shift took place. It is in this
shifting position that we are confronted with a fundamental aporia. While Calley was
pardoned for doing his duty, for being a true “American boy,” and “not questioning how
or why we should fight,”84 England was widely reproached for not questioning the
ethicality of her orders. There is a similar aporia when considering the role of
photography.
During the high-budget documentary about the Abu Ghraib prison abuse by Errol
Morris, Standard Operating Procedure (2008), there is a clever bit of editing when two
conflicting views of photography are presented to accompany various slides of the blood
remains of a murdered prisoner. Army Special Agent Brent Pack, the man who analyzed
the metadata of the images to establish a timeline for the courts, perhaps unconsciously
echoing Roland Barthes, describes photographs as direct records of what had been:
“Photographs are what they are…you’re seeing what happened at that time.”85 While
SPC Megan Ambuhl, one of the military police stationed at the prison during the time of
the abuse, did not grant the images the same kind of truth-value. She described the
images as mere slices of frozen time, framing as much out of view as they frame in,
incapable of the same kind of historical truth content that memory allows: “[the
circumstance of the actual event] doesn’t appear when you see a picture…the pictures
84
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only show you a fraction of a second. You don’t see forward and you don’t see backward
and you don’t see outside the frame.”86
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CHAPTER 4. CONCLUSION: PHOTOGRAPHY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND
EUPHEMISMS

Throughout wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, allegations were rampant of
gross collateral damage from U.S. combat strategies. R.J. Rummel estimated that
between 800,000 and 1,200,000 civilians died in both North and South Vietnam during
the twenty years of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The Iraq War Logs released by
WikiLeaks showed 66,081 civilian casualties in Iraq from January 2004 to December
2009 as a result of U.S.-led invasion.87 No such numbers definitively exist for the war in
Afghanistan, as was famously extolled by U.S. General Tommy Franks, “You know we
don’t do body counts.”88 Aggregate estimates based on collective reports estimate a range
of 10,000 to as many as 60,000 from 2001 – 2011 killed by U.S. and coalition forces,
however many consider those numbers to be inaccurate due to the absence of systematic
documentation available from the war in Iraq.89
The images of these unintended deaths were much more numerous, and much
more in the public eye during and after the Vietnam War than they have been or
(presumably) will be as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan come to a close. The
impressions left by photographs from the Vietnam War, and the blame shouldered by
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soldiers, lingered long after the war ended. Elizabeth Samet wrote in August of 2011,
“The specter of this guilt – this perdurable archetype of the hostile homecoming –
animates today’s encounters, which seem to have swung to the other unthinking
extreme.”90
To a large extent, the soldiers who went to Vietnam had, until they arrived and
saw it for what it was, romanticized war. Like the ones featured in John Wayne movies,
and now happily replicated in Sunset Soldiers photographs. What they realized was that
the lovely and heroic fiction that they expected was just a farce. That war was dirt and
pain, death and destruction. The documents of the war genuinely painted this picture –
one of disillusionment before the war ended. We experienced the same war, the dirty ugly
one, empathetically via the metonymical photograph. If there was any lesson to be
learned photographically from Vietnam it was this – that meddling in someone else’s
ideological tug-of-war was messy, un-heroic business, and that when war is shown via
photographs as a youth-wrecking, travesty-riddled, cesspool of hate perpetuation, it is a
powerful, relatable indictment of that war.
That lesson is what is so disturbing about the pictures of glory when they reappear
to give context to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Reality is sanitized into euphemism.
Photographs from the Vietnam War initiated us into a period where we could no longer
deny the power of images in the political sphere. When we see deep and nuanced
portraits of soldier life, though they seem to be intended as ends in themselves, their
ideological function cannot be taken for granted. After the Vietnam War, it’s hard to not
90
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be cynical about those images that I’ve called “patriotic fables.” In glorifying and
sentimentalizing the soldier, those photographs glorify and sentimentalize war in itself,
which is most often neither glorious nor worthy of sentiment.
With photojournalism, the problem of objectivity is at the heart of the problem of
ideology. Despite the fact that on some level cameras record accurately whatever is
framed in the lens, connotation interferes. Looking at an image of the tortured body of an
enemy elicits an emotional response from the viewer that leads to empathy. Sometimes
this is unwarranted. Defendants who are being tried for violent crimes often appeal
especially inflammatory photographs. They claim that photographs are inadmissible
evidence based on the fact that they are inflammatory and invoke a prejudiced response
that is unfair to the person accused of the crimes.91
If photographs of soldiers abusing the enemy are in fact mischaracterizations, then
empathy is illegitimately manufactured. Therefore, if we can be convinced that these
images are generally untrue in their premises, and consider that all the images being
huddled into secrecy are being hidden because they perpetuate a fundamental
misconception, that although the referent appears to be abuse, in reality justice was being
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For example: “In the matter of Queen v. Jeffrey (1966) in the Supreme Court of
Victoria (Court of Criminal Appeal) Barry, Smith and Gillard JJ., in their judgment on
one of the grounds for appeal in that: the learned trail judge erred in admitting in
evidence photographs that the defense requested to be excluded on the grounds that they
were of little or no probative value, yet were so horrifying or gruesome in nature as to be
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honestly done, then we can easily assume this kind of empathy prevention is not only
warranted, but, on some level, ethical.
Ultimately, what this all drives down to are questions about responsibility and
rights. Do news organizations and the government have a responsibility to show the
public the ugly side of war or to shield them from it? Does the public have a right to see
those ugly photographs? If the public can claim a right to access photographed content,
then what about the rights of photographed persons? If the photographed person is held
responsible for the content of the image, can that person claim any rights to the image?
Any answer to any of these questions inevitably affects the answer to the other questions.
Photographs that imagined the Vietnam War both encouraged and reflected public
opposition to war, making real and visible the crimes that take place under the aegis of a
responsibility to police the world. However, the burden of those crimes fell onto the
soldiers. It was the soldiers who functioned in the photographs as a metonym for the ugly
war, where some would claim the unjust State was more legitimately at fault.
Photographers during the Vietnam War felt a responsibility to document the horrors, and
media organizations felt a responsibility to show those images to the public. In doing so
however, the photographers violated the rights of the photographed persons and their
post-war reputations.
Photographs from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan picture soldiers as worthy of a
respect they were long denied. Photographers who were ejected from their embeds were
ejected for violating the rights of photographed persons, but in being ejected they were
prevented from bringing the public a view of the ugly side of war. In addition, the
redemption of the character of the soldier doesn’t reassign the blame for the atrocities
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committed. It further masks the trail leading to those responsible. In that masking, though
it redeems the soldier from shame, it allows for the continuation of conflicts that cost too
many lives, foreign and domestic.
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